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INTRODUCTION

From its origins as an ecclesiastical term, the word propaganda has
gradually assumed a secular role.' Indeed, its secularization is closely
followed by the notoriety for which it has come to be known. Propaganda is currently used to characterize certain types of communicative
actions: the systematic, coordinated manipulation of symbols to influence
behavior; the dissemination of false information to induce behavior that
would not occur absent the information; or a combination of these situations. And generally, the term is used not only to describe but also to
evaluate communicative actions. In some social systems the term has a
dual usage,2 while in others-especially in the West-it is used pejoratively to describe communications whose intentions and functional consequences are considered illegitimate.' Leonard Doob was in some sense
correct when he noted that "[a]n effective way in Anglo-Saxon society to.
4
insult, belittle, or expose a man is to call him a propagandist."
This Article will use the term propaganda in its negative sense and
explore its impact on developing nations' capacity for self-determination.

1. Initially, the term propaganda referred to the Committee of Cardinals in the
Roman curia, Congregatio de propaganda fides (Congregation for the Propagation of
Faith), established in 1622 by Pope Gregory XV and charged with overseeing foreign
missions. C. CHERRY, WORLD COMMUNICATION: THREAT OR PROMISE? 113 (2d ed.
1971).
2. In the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, propaganda is used in both a
positive and a negative sense depending upon the identity of the communicator and also
its perceived intentions. Propaganda can be used in a positive sense to describe communicative actions designed to explain the cause and achievements of socialism to both internal and external audiences. It can also be used in a negative sense to deride and discredit
communicative actions that are seen as contrary to the national interest and the cause of
socialism. When used negatively, adjectives like "imperialist" are usually attached to the
term to clearly illustrate the perceived intention and value of the communication. See
generally V. LENIN, WHAT IS TO BE DONE? (1943); B. WOLFE, THREE WHO MADE A
REVOLUTION (1948); Grzybowski, Propagandaand the Soviet Concept of World Public
Order, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 479 (1966).
3. Powell, Towards a Negotiable Definition of Propagandafor International
Agreements Related to Direct Broadcast Satellites, 45 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3
(1982) ("Among the accusatory statements made during periods of international tension,
few terms are more derogatory than 'propaganda.' ").
Some in the United States, however, argue for a positive understanding of propaganda.
Thomas Sorensen, a former United States information officer, urges that the United
States must also "engage in propaganda," and that "merely 'informing' people" is not
enough; its communication institutions must be "advocates, persuaders-propagandists"
for our views and values. T. SORENSEN, THE WORD WAR: THE STORY OF AMERICAN
PROPAGANDA at x (1968).
4. L. DooB, PUBLIC OPINION AND PROPAGANDA 231 (1948).

INTERNATIONAL PROPAGANDA
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Following a brief suggestion about a workable definition in Part II, Part
III isolates the particular threat that propaganda poses for developing
nations. Part IV then surveys the fractured history of international propaganda regulation. Part V examines the relationship between self-determination and propaganda, with specific reference to disinformation and
what will be termed "structural propaganda." Individual state responses
to propaganda are outlined in Part VI. Part VII explores the same issue
on the international level and suggests the creation of an international
right of correction as well as a mass media council. Part VIII explicitly
links the right of correction and mass media council with the current
international movement (primarily constituted by developing countries)
for access to the international media. Indeed, this section argues that
these two institutions-the right of correction and mass media council-must provide an integral part of the institutional framework
through which developing countries may gain access to the international
media. Finally, Part IX concludes that international solutions are available and should be adopted if developing nations are to escape the deleterious impact of propaganda.
II.

TOWARD A DEFINITION OF PROPAGANDA

Propaganda is a structural or preconceived, systematic manipulation
of symbols, aimed at promoting uniform behavior of social groups congruent with the specific interests of the communicator.' This communication may be characterized by either of the following: (1) It is intentionally false, in which case it is called disinformation; or (2) It is selectively
false, in which case one might refer to it as distorted or unbalanced information. In addition, the following desired outcomes or functional consequences distinguish propaganda from other forms of communication:
(1) It might be intended to undermine the legitimacy of social and political institutions of a community or a nation, in which case one might
refer to it as hostile or subversive; or (2) because of the selective (distorted) and one-sided nature of the communication, it might have the
functional consequence of undermining the cultural and social structures
of a community and hence undermine that community's capacity for selfdetermination. This Article will refer to this as structural negation of
5. B. HAZAN, SOVIET PROPAGANDA: A CASE STUDY OF THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT 12 (1976). See also Reports of the Working Group on DirectBroadcast Satellites:
Comments Received from Governments, Specialized Agencies, and Other Competent InternationalBodies, 25 U.N. GAOR Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space at 7,
U.N. Doc. A/AC..105/79 (1970) [hereinafter Reports of the Working Group on DBS];
T. QUALTER, PROPAGANDA AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE 27 (1962).
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self-determination. Thus, for the purpose of this analysis of interstate
propaganda, the term propaganda is fully defined as a systematic manipulation of symbols that is structurally selective and one-sided or intentionally false, and which has a desired outcome or functional consequence of undermining the political and socio-cultural institutions of a
community or a nation, either overtly or covertly.
So defined, propaganda clearly presents a legitimate concern for developing countries6 and should be included in any debate on international
information flow. Propaganda in the above sense is, by its very nature,
dominating, antidialogic,7 and manipulative. It effectively denies individuals and communities an essential condition for self-determination-accurate and balanced information. Accordingly, propaganda becomes injurious both to its intended victim and its target audience, who
are sometimes one and the same. For example, a government might im-

6. The states of the world may be dichotomized in various ways: North-South,
East-West, Developed-Underdeveloped, Developed-Developing, and IndustrializedThird World. In this Article, "developing," "Third World," and "underdeveloped" will
refer to the same group of countries. A precise definition of these terms is not possible,
for they do not refer to a homogeneous entity. In this Article, however, the terms will
refer to those states (mainly in Asia, Africa, and Latin America) whose general socioeconomic conditions are structurally underdeveloped and whose attitudes toward the existing international order reflect the belief that this order contributed to their unfavorable
socio-economic and cultural conditions. See Greene, Toward a Definition of the Term
Third World, I B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 13 (1980); Langley, The Third World: Towards a Definition, 2 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1 (1981).
7. Dialogue involves an interactive or communicative situation in which each individual, group, or nation is recognized as an active participant. To conceive of active participation among groups as an important feature of dialogue is to concede that sameness and
difference are constituent parts of it. For the dialogic interaction to continue, participants
must simultaneously realize that they are equal and different. Put simply, dialogue is at
once the establishment of the difference and the discovery of sameness; it is a meeting of
subjects in order to name and transform the world. On the other hand, in the antidialogic
(monologic) encounter, the dominating "I" transforms the dominated "you" into a mere
"it." The dominated becomes nothing more than an instrument for the accomplishment
of the monologically defined goals of the dominator.
Dialogue may be personal or institutional. In many ways dialogue in the age of mass
society (both nationally and internationally) concerns institutional dialogue in which all
potential participants have access to means of mass communication; equal chances to
criticize or refute all explanations, interpretations, and justifications; and the opportunity
to advance alternatives. Dialogue, therefore, assumes the distribution of communication
resources in such a way that all participants have the necessary resources that will enable
them to interact actively. For an interesting formulation of dialogic communication, see
Cornell, Toward a ModernlPostmodernReconstruction of Ethics, 133 U. PA. L. REV.

291 (1985). See also R.
HERMENEUTICS,

BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE,

AND PRAXIS

(1983).
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plant false information in order to mislead a nation's elite in terms of
judgments they must make, or a medium may deliberately disseminate
false information to persuade a particular audience to take the position
the disseminator prefers. Most often, however, the two are different. ,*
When, for example, one implants a forged document purporting to be a
secret plan or communication from agents of one nation (the intended
victim) to the elite or the public of a third nation (the target audience),
the target audience whom the document is attempting to influence is
clearly quite different from the intended victim.8
The injury to the intended victim as a result of propaganda is clear
and needs no elaboration. Yet, even when the target audience is different
from the intended victim, the injury to that audience is no less severe
because propaganda denies it the ingredients-the necessary prerequisites-for making appropriate decisions. In other words, propaganda denies its target audience an accurate flow of information and hence its
capacity to make informed choices.
III.

THE RISING CONCERN IN DEVELOPING NATIONS ABOUT THE
THREAT OF INTERNATIONAL PROPAGANDA

"When two elephants fight it is the grass that suffers."

Tanzanian Proverb.
Although propaganda has been a staple diet of international relations
for a major portion of world history, developing nations are increasingly
concerned by its prominence in the modern, post-colonial era.9 This uneasiness may be explained by three related factors: (1) the rapidly advancing sophistication and reach of communications technology; (2) the
widespread perception that the superpowers consider developing nations
solely in terms of geopoliticial calculations; and (3) the realization that

8. A good example of this involved an incident that created tension between United
States and Ghana in 1983. A forged dispatch from the West German Embassy in Accra,
Ghana appeared in Ghanian papers. The document alleged that the United States Ambassador to Ghana had complained about his CIA staff for its lack of progress in toppling the Ghanian Government. U.S. Dep't St., Soviet Active Measures, Special Report
No. 110 5 (1983) [hereinafter Special Report No. 110], reprintedin Soviet Active Measures: Hearings on United States Policy Toward East Europe, West Europe, and the
Soviet Union Before the Subcomm. on European Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, 215 (1985) [hereinafter Hearings on Soviet
Active Measures]. The target audiences here were the Ghanian elite and public, while
the intended victim was obviously the United States Government.
9. See 3 PROPAGANDA AND COMMUNICATION IN WORLD HISTORY 516-34 (H.
Lasswell, D. Lerner, & H. Speier eds. 1980).
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informational and cultural independence are constitutive elements of
genuine and full independence.
A.

Advances in Communications Technology

The spectacular transformation in communications technology in the
past two decades seems to provide the propagandist with immeasurably
more powerful means of disseminating his message, correlatively making
the intended victim more vulnerable. Perhaps the best example of this
phenomenon is the emergence of the direct broadcasting satellite (DBS),
which may see widespread use in the future. Direct broadcasting satellites are high power satellites that "take audio and video signals from
ground or other supersurface transmitters and retransmit them in the
form of radio communication for direct reception by dish-shaped antennae."'10 Thus, DBS will enable a transmitting state or private entity to
reach citizens of another state without the receiving state's cooperation or
consent. Citizens of the receiving state simply need a small dish on which
to pick up the broadcast. Moreover, because direct broadcasting satellites
are stationed in the geostationary orbit," a single DBS signal can cover
forty-three percent of the earth's surface, encompassing many countries
and cultures.' 2
The positive potential of DBS is immense. It makes possible a much
wider dissemination of information and cultural intercourse among nations, while also enabling nations with many remote areas and rugged
terrain to reach citizens whom they could not have reached in any other

10.

The Georgetown Space Law Group, DBS Under FCC and InternationalReguVAND. L. REV. 67, 69 n.1 (1984). See generally MCPHAIL, ELEcTRONIC

lation, 37

COLONIALISM: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING AND COMMUNICA-

TION (1981).
11. The geostationary orbit is a circular orbit roughly 22,300 miles (35,800 kilometers) above the equator and approximately 163,000 miles (260,000 kilometers) in length.
A satellite placed here completes one orbit each day. Because this orbit lies above the
equator and moves in the direction of the earth's rotation, it appears stationary. The
Georgetown Space Law Group, The GeostationaryOrbit: Legal, Technical and Political Issues Surrounding Its Use in World Telecommunications, 16 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 223, 230 (1984); Gorove, The GeostationaryOrbit: Issues of Law and Policy,
73 AM. J. INT'L L. 444, 445 (1979); Theis, The InternationalLegal Codefor Geostationary Radio Satellites, 29 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 227, 227 (1986); Wiessner, The Public
Order of the GeostationaiyOrbit: Blueprintsfor the Future, 9 YALE J. OF WORLD PUB.
ORD.

217 (1983).

12. Three satellites can provide continuous coverage of the entire earth's surface. If a
different orbit were utilized, more satellites would be needed to cover the same area, and
these would require regular adjustment. Consequently, the geostationary orbit offers the
least expensive and most effective alternative. See Theis, supra note 11, at 227.
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way. DBS, however, can also be threatening to receiving states, especially developing countries, which justifiably fear that technological developments like DBS will intensify the monologic and one-sided interactive process that is now a feature of international communications. There
are two reasons for this: (1) the technological and financial resources for
DBS are (and will likely remain for the foreseeable future) in the hands
of a few developed nations;1" and (2) other areas of information flow
demonstrate that the monopoly of technological and financial resources of
information has been accompanied by an unbalanced flow of information
both quantitatively (in terms of volume of flow) and qualitatively (in
terms of selection and interpretation of events). 4 Without an interna-

13. "The costs of a DBS system are high, so high that in the foreseeable future only
wealthy countries will be able to afford this new broadcasting technique." Magiera, Direct Broadcastingby Satellite and a New InternationalInformation Order, 24 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 288, 297 (1981). See also Reports of the Working Group on DBS,
supra note 5, at 3.
14. The quantitative imbalance in international news flow is highlighted by the fact
that the four largest Western news agencies (Associated Press, Agence France-Presse,
Reuters, and United Press International) produce and disseminate between eighty and
ninety percent of the world's news. Only about twenty to thirty percent of this news
focuses on developing countries, although seventy-five percent of humankind lives in
these countries. See Masmoudi, The New World Information Order, 29 J. COMM. 172,
173 (1979). Given this disparity in the flow of news between developed and developing
countries, one observer has noted that "much more news flows from the industrialized
world to the developing world than the other way, and much more international news of
the industrialized world occupies space in the Third World media than the other way."
Samarajiwa, Third World Entry to the World Market in News: Problems and Possible
Solutions, 6 MEDIA, CULTURE AND SOCIETY 119, 127 (1984). Because the pool out of
which they get their supply of "news" is so limited, developing countries read and hear
more about developed countries than they do about other developing countries, and sometimes even about themselves. See Larson, U.S. Television Coverage on Foreign News, in
WORLD COMMUNICATIONS: A HANDBOOK 112 (G. Gerbner & M. Siefert eds. 1984)
[hereinafter WORLD COMMUNICATIONS].
The quantitative disparity is not limited to news. The flow of television programs,
movies, and magazines shows the same tendency. See generally Tracey, The Poisoned
Chalice? InternationalTelevision and the Idea of Dominance, 114 DAEDALUS No. 4,
17 (1985); Vais, The International Flow of Television Programs, 34 J. COMM. 143
(1984). The disparity is even more glaring in the area of transnational advertising. Janus, TransnationalAdvertising: The Latin American Case, in WORLD COMMUNICATIONS, supra at 137; Rancagliolo, Advertising, Mass Media and Dependency, DEv. DIALOGUE 81 (1979); see also C. MEDAWAR, INSULT OR INJURY? AN INQUIRY INTO THE
MARKETING AND ADVERTISING OF BRITISH FOOD AND DRUG PRODUCTS IN THE
THIRD WORLD (1979). Finally, the relatively new field of informatics shows similar

signs of imbalance. Bortnick, InternationalInformation Flow. The Developing World
Perspective, 14 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 333, 335 (1981); see also IBI, INFORMATICS IN
THE SERVICE OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (1979).
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tional agreement regulating DBS transmission, developing countries fear
that the power of getting to the homes of citizens of other countries is
likely to be utilized effectively by the disseminator to undermine any
government or society of which the disseminator does not approve or
perceives as a threat. Given that television pictures leave an intense impression on the receiver, and considering the absence of the relative mutuality and reciprocity present in radio broadcast, the fear of developing
nations is real and warranted.
B.

Geopolitical Considerations

The increasingly prevalent attitude of the superpowers that the world
must be understood as an extension of themselves, intensifies developing
nations' concern over interstate propaganda. This perception often leads
to characterizing the aspirations of individual developing countries, or
even their collective demand, as being instigated by one or the other superpower and hence as nothing more than a reflection of the current
interest of that superpower. 15 Consider, for example, the Western nations' response, and especially that of the United States, to the developing nations' demand for a reconstitution of the international communication process. Private and public institutions in this country have long
viewed this demand as another of Moscow's tactics to use these countries
to push for international legalization of its authoritarian and restrictive
concept of communication."6 The legitimate concern of developing countries over the quantitative and qualitative imbalance in international information flow was simply reduced to another manifestation of Moscow's evil design. Consider also how the superpowers characterize
struggles for nation-building in Central America and Southern Africa:
They are seen not as genuine efforts for self-determination and nationbuilding in light of the unique historical conditions that define their pre-

The qualitative imbalance that worries developing countries arises in the context of the
nature of their entry as sources of news. Of the twenty to thirty percent of total news
coverage that concerns developing countries, the majority is ill-informed, sensational, and
dwells almost exclusively on exceptional issues like corruption, coups, and disasters. Potter, News From Three Worlds in Prestige U.S. Newspapers, 64 JOURNALISM Q. 73
(1987); see also A. SMITH, THE GEOPOLITICS OF INFORMATION: How WESTERN CULTURE DOMINATES THE WORLD (1980).
15. See Valcourt, Plausible Deniability and Waging War, 1 INT'L J. OF INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE No. 3, 119 (1987) (reviewing J. PRADOS, A REVIEW OF PRESIDENTS' SECRET WARS (1987)).
16. "It is in the Third World that the war for international supremacy is being
fought by the two superpowers.... ." Id. at 122.
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sent, but rather as arenas of superpower contention.' 7 Simply put, the
superpowers confront the struggles in the various parts of the developing
world by deciding who they are for, rather than who they are.
Given the bipolar lens through which the superpowers view the world,
developing countries legitimately believe that if powerful communication
technologies like DBS are not regulated on the international level, they
will be utilized to undermine them. Consider the likely result if the
United States Government were able to reach directly the homes of Nicaraguan citizens via the DBS equivalent of Radio Marti. 8 What would
it tell those citizens? How would it characterize the Nicaraguan Government? And what action would it recommend that Nicaraguan citizens
take?
The urgent concern about unregulated international propaganda is
thus informed by the emergence of two contradictory tendencies: (I) the
internationalization of social life, ushered in by new and powerful communication technologies; (2) and the parochialization of international
politics. 9 The combination of the two leaves developing countries highly
17. For example, one might argue that the Reagan Administration's policy toward
Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe is informed not by the social and political conditions out of which these states are trying to build nations, but by the perceived role of the
Soviet Union in the region. The Reagan Administration warmly embraces and supports
Jonas Savimbi's guerrilla force fighting to overthrow the Angolan Government not for its
positive political program, but simply because it is seen to negate the alleged Soviet influence in that country.
18. Radio Marti is a United States-funded radio station established by Congress in
September 1983 and devoted to broadcasting the "truth" about the Cuban Government
to the Cuban people. See Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act, 22 U.S.C. § 1465 (Supp. IV
1986). Radio Marti is modeled after Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, stations
which are considered children of the cold war. Radio Free Europe broadcasts to Eastern
Europe from its headquarters in Munich, West Germany, while Radio Liberty beams
programs in eleven dialects into the Soviet Union. See Uttaro, The Voices of America in
InternationalRadio Propaganda,45 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. No. 1, 103 (1982); see
also WORLD RADIO TV HANDBOOK (1988). Serious journalists and broadcasters regard
Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty as little more than instruments of propaganda in
the cold war battle.
Radio Marti is similarly designed as a cold war station, to accomplish in Cuba what
the other two stations have been doing in relation to Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union. As former National Security Adviser Richard V. Allen explained, the station was
created to "tell the truth to the Cuban people about their government's domestic mismanagement and its promotion of subversion and international terrorism in this hemisphere
and elsewhere." Feltman, Voice of America's New Radio Station to Cuba, 8 FLETCHER
F. 81, 82 (1984).
19. "International life and politics today are marked by two parallel tendencies that
complemenf each other and to some degree overlap. One can be called the globalization
of international problems, and the other regionalization." Varis, Trends in International
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vulnerable. One commentator put this concern well:
We must recognize that despite our earlier hopes broadcasting has not
turned out to be the means of international understanding that we once
imagined it might be. On the contrary (and speaking particularly of television), broadcasting today seems to have turned inwards and become the
instrument of increased nationalism. Our screens do not reflect the pulse
of the world events, but rather the feeble beats of life at home, and when
we get the occasional glimpse of larger issues, they tend to be seen from a
selfish, national viewpoint. 0
C. Informational Independence as a Prerequisitefor SelfDetermination
The developing nations are increasingly aware of the fact that the process of self-determination cannot be fully realized by political and economic independence alone: to be meaningful it must also encompass
socio-cultural, or informational, self-determination. It is becoming increasingly clear to these countries that having a national government, a
flag, a national anthem, a seat in the United Nations, and even a national banking system are, although necessary conditions, insufficient to
achieve complete self-determination. Political and economic self-determination must be closely followed by socio-cultural self-determination.
This perception emerges from the realization that channels of communication and messages can be as much a part of the structure of domination as are military forces, administrative apparatuses, and the structure
of the international banking system.21 In other words, a community's
consciousness about its identity, and how that identity is shaped, is as
much a part of its independence as are political and economic conditions.
How a community sees itself and how it is seen by others (which in turn
affects how it sees itself) help define the identity of that community-its
aspirations, priorities, and agenda. Consequently, the struggle for the
constitution of one's identity is at the center of the debate.

Television Flow, 7 INT'L POL. Sci. REV. 235 (1986).
20. D'Arcy, Broadcasting in the Global Village, 43 COMBROAD 1-2 (1979). The
truth of D'Arcy's observation is reflected in a statement made by Representative Edward
J. Derwinski during a committee hearing on appropriation for Radio Free Europe and
Radio Liberty. Derwinski argued that international broadcasting was a "'radio war'
with the Soviet Union." H.R. REP. No. 971, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 22, 23 (1980).
21. "'Imperialism,' whether military, economic, cultural or informative, is contrary
to an organization of states which is based on the principle of sovereign equality of all its
members, as art. 2, para. 1, of the United Nations Charter emphasizes." Mtgiera, supra
note 13, at 304.
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From this last perspective, developing countries' concern about international propaganda is merely an aspect of their shared suspicion about
the entire international structure and the process through which information flows and within which communication resources are distributed"2 -which they consider highly concentrated and monologic.
IV.

INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF PROPAGANDA

International law has always purported to be conscious of the negative
impact of unimpeded propaganda across national borders2" and has, at
least theoretically, attempted to provide for some form of regulation. The
League of Nations sponsored the first multilateral effort to regulate
peacetime propaganda in the 1936 International Convention Concerning
the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace (1936 Broadcasting Convention).2 4 Although various nations and international organizations pre22. During the last decade, developing countries have expressed this concern by advocating the creation of a New World Information and Communication Order
(NWICO) which, they hope, will be much more sensitive to their communications and
informational needs. See, e.g., Venezuelan Resolution, UNESCO, Doc. 21C/DR.264
(1980). The movement has encountered stiff resistance from the developed countries and
is currently dormant.
Three international materials in particular comprise NWICO: (1) Declaration on
FundamentalPrinciplesConcerning the Contribution of the Mass Media to Strengthening Peace and InternationalUnderstandingto the Promotion of Human Rights and to
Countering Racialism, Apartheid and Incitement to War, 20 UNESCO Gen. Conf.,
UNESCO Doc. 20C/20 Rev. (1978) [hereinafter Mass Media Declaration];(2) INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF COMMUNICATION
VOICES, ONE WORLD:

COMMUNICATION

AND

SOCIETY, TODAY

PROBLEMS, MANY
AND

TOMORROW

(1980) [hereinafter MANY VOICES, ONE WORLD]; and (3) InternationalProgrammefor
the Development of Communication (IPDC), UNESCO Res. 4/21, 21 UNESCO Gen.
Conf., (1980).
23. Some have rejected this general condemnation of propaganda, arguing that propaganda often averts more serious methods of confrontation, such as economic pressure or
outright war. In effect, these commentators assert that propaganda helps take the steam
off the boiling kettle of international relations. See Falk, On Regulating International
Propaganda:A Pleafor Moderate Aims, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 622, 634 (1966)
("Hostile propaganda directed at the third world may restrict great-power conflict to
mutually tolerable limits."). This proposition fails for two reasons. First, empirical evidence indicates that propaganda may actually induce rather than avert conflict. See Larson, The Present Status of Propagandain InternationalLaw, 31 LAW & CONTEMP.
PRons. 439, 439-40 (1966) (noting the intense propaganda campaign preceding the First
World War). Second, the proposition ignores the fact that propaganda is as coercive (and
perhaps even more so), for its objective is the negation of the very constitution of the
individual: his or her capacity as a thinking being.
24. InternationalConvention Concerning the Use of Broadcastingin the Cause of
Peace, Sept. 23, 1936, 186 L.N.T.S. 301 [hereinafter 1936 BroadcastingConvention].

502

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol 21:491

viously had endeavored to come to grips with both the nature of propaganda and the appropriate mode of its regulation, 5 the 1936

Twenty-eight states signed the Convention: Albania, Argentina, Austria, Belgium,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, Estonia, France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Greece, India, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Rumania, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, the Soviet Union, and Uruguay. The United States
never joined the League of Nations and thus did not sign the 1936 Broadcasting
Convention.
25. Since the French Revolution, states have generally agreed that customary international law prohibits the dissemination of hostile propaganda between nations. Van
Dyke, The Responsibility of States for InternationalPropaganda,34 AM. J. INT'L L.
58, 58-59 (1940). This, however, did not restrain some states from engaging in the act.
Following the French Revolution, for example, France spread official propaganda about
other countries and in turn was itself a victim of propaganda. Id. at 63-64.
With respect to private propaganda, however, no such general agreement existed. The
state's responsibility to suppress private propaganda by its citizens across the border of
another nation, and to punish those who purvey it, has been claimed as a norm of customary international law on many occasions. France cited this principle in 1802 during a
dispute with Great Britain; Germany did likewise in the 1870s in relation to the activities of the Catholic bishops in France and Belgium; Japan did the same in the course of
its protest against the Chinese government's toleration of propaganda against it; and even
the United States, which traditionally allows no governmental control over private expression, placed responsibility on the Soviet Government for anti-American propaganda
disseminated by private entities, groups, or persons. In each of the instances above, the
accused party denied that it had any responsibility under international law. Id. at 65-68.
One of the earliest attempts to regulate propaganda under an international convention
occurred in 1907 with the adoption of the Hague Convention Respecting the Rights and
Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat.
2310, T.S. No. 540. Article 3, for example, prohibited belligerents from establishing and
employing telegraph stations on neutral territory for use as a means of communication.
Id., 36 Stat. at 2322-23. Article 5 required neutral countries to punish such acts when
they occurred within their territories. Id., 36 Stat. at 2323. In the United States, the
Wilson Government accepted the provisions of this treaty and, through executive orders,
prohibited the transmission of "unneutral" messages across the Atlantic and required
that all stations with the capacity for transatlantic transmission be placed under governmental control. See Act of Aug. 13, 1912, 47 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (repealed 1927). The
United States' agreement to control propaganda at this time, while contrary to its general
promotion of unfettered communication, may be explained by the fact that the wartime
emergency necessitated a close monitoring of interstate communications. See de Wolf,
Telecommunications and Neutrality, 30 AM. J. INT'L L. 117, 120 (1936).
During the interim between the 1907 Hague Convention, supra, and the 1936 Broadcasting Convention, supra note 24, states dealt with propaganda mainly as a bilateral
issue and usually addressed it as a section of a bilateral treaty. See, e.g., Treaty of Neutrality and Non-Aggression, June 24, 1931, Afghanistan-U.S.S.R., art. 3, 157 L.N.T.S.
371, 379-80; Supplementary Agreement to the Treaty of Rapallo, Nov. 5, 1922, Germany-U.S.S.R., art. 7, 26 L.N.T.S. 387, 394. See also Exchange of Communications
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Broadcasting Convention still provides the most useful point of departure
for it is the most comprehensive and perhaps the most systematic thus
far. Indeed, it continues to provide the mode of discourse both about the
nature of international propaganda and the desirability or necessity of its
regulation.
The 1936 Broadcasting Convention ostensibly offered a firm foundation for the international cooperation needed to curb the spread of propaganda across national boundaries. Article 1 required the signatory
parties:
to prohibit and, if occasion arises, to stop without delay the broadcasting
within their respective territories of any transmission which ...is of such
a character as to incite the population of any territory to acts incompatible
with the internal order or the security of a territory of a High Contracting
26

Party.

Article 3 extended the prohibition to "statements the incorrectness of
which is or ought to be known to the persons responsible for the broadcast" and required parties to the convention to ensure that such "incorrect statements shall be rectified at the earliest possible moment by the
most effective means, even if the incorrectness has become apparent only
after the broadcast has taken place."2 7
The above provisions did not distinguish between private and public
communications and generally charged the signatory states with the responsibility to control and regulate such propaganda emanating from
within their territorial jurisdictions. 8 Unfortunately, the document did
not contain an enforcement mechanism to compel compliance by delinquent states.29 With that knowledge, and in anticipation of the likelihood
between the Presidentof the United States [Franklin D. Roosevelt] and Maxim M. Litvinov People's Commissarfor Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(White House press release), reprintedin 28 AM. J.

INT'L

L. 2, 3 (Supp. 1934) (agree-

ing not to engage in hostile propaganda). For a survey of such agreements, see Downey,
A HistoricalSurvey of the InternationalRegulation of Propaganda,1984 MICH. Y.B.
INT'L LEGAL STUD. 341, 342-45.
26. 1936 Broadcasting Convention, supra note 24, art. 1.
27.
28.

Id. art. 3.
Article 1 narrowly defined propaganda as information likely to incite the popula-

tion of a country to act contrary to the security of that state. Id. art. 1.
29.

Article 7 provided that any dispute regarding the interpretation of the Conven-

tion would be reviewed through international arbitration or judicial settlement in the
absence of any provisions in force between the states concerning the settlement of inter-

national disputes. If the parties did not agree on the forum for dispute settlement, then
either party could request that the case go before the Permanent Court of International

Justice (PCIJ) provided that the disputants were parties to the Protocol regarding the
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of breach, some states reserved the right to retaliate against propaganda
by jamming the proscribed broadcast.3 0
Some regional conventions concluded in the 1930s reinforced the provisions of the 1936 Broadcasting Convention. In 1935, for example, the
Organization of American States (OAS) adopted the South American
Regional Agreement on Radiocommunications, in which contracting
states pledged to control the sources and accuracy of information broadcasted, to avoid hostile propaganda, and to refrain from participating in
political and social movements in any member state." Parties to this
agreement also concluded conventions in 19372 and 1940a prohibiting
the dissemination of false news, information that disturbed peaceful relationship among members, and communications that offended national
sentiment.
Neither the 1936 Broadcasting Convention nor the above regional conventions enjoyed a healthy or long existence. Efforts to develop systematic regional and international responses to propaganda crumbled under
the pressure of the intense propaganda war that preceded World War II.
It was, therefore, not until after World War II that the search for effective international agreements regarding propaganda began.
While the United Nations Charter, which was adopted in 1947, does
not specifically mention propaganda, its drafters arguably had propaganda in their thoughts when they constructed article 39. The article

Statute of the Court. Id. art. 7.
Most members knew, however, that this was not an adequate enforcement mechanism.
First, the delinquent party might use the choice of forum to delay or even avoid dispute
settlement institutions. Second, even if the parties agreed on the forum, the length of time
required for the decision of the international institutions (especially the PCIJ) would be
so inordinately long that, by the time a judgment was rendered, its practical usefulness
might be negligible. Third, even if the arbitral or judicial determinations were of some
practical value (for example, if the offending act were still continuing and the arbitral or
judicial institution called for its cessation), no mechanism could force the delinquent
party to carry out the order. See id.
30. Belgium, Spain, and the Soviet Union made that reservation. See 1936 Broadcasting Convention, supra note 24, 186 L.N.T.S. at 314-17.
31. South American Regional Agreement on Radiocommunications, April 10, 1935,
reprinted in 7 M. HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 47, 51-52 (1941) (treaty not
registered with the League of Nations); see also Whitton, The Problem of CurbingInternational Propaganda,31 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBS. 601, 609-10 (1966).
32. South American Regional Agreement on Radicommunications (Revised), June
20, 1937, reprinted in 7 M. HUDSON, supra note 31, at 767, 769-70.
33. South American Agreement on Radiocommunications, Jan. 17, 1940, reprinted
in 8 M. HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 447 (1949) (noting minor changes in
South American Regional Agreement on Radiocommunications (Revised), supra note
32).
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empowers the United Nations Security Council to determine the existence of, and consider appropriate measures to defuse, peace threatening
situations.3 Both disinformation (intentionally false information) and
distorted information (selectively false information) may be considered
peace threatening activities if the disseminator intends them to be hostile
or subversive and they are so perceived by the intended victim. Thus, one
may argue that article 39, read in conjunction with article 2(4) 35 contemplates the regulation and management of interstate propaganda.
Two major international human rights documents place further restrictions on the dissemination of propagandistic information. Article
29(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights gives states the
right to regulate information for the purpose of securing "public order."'36 Article 19(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights similarly provides that states may restrict information flow to
maintain and protect national security or public order ("order public").3
Only article 20 of that covenant, however, specifically refers to propaganda. 8
The repudiation of propaganda designed or having the capacity to
provoke or encourage any threat to peace may thus be seen as an internationally recognized norm. This is true not only because of the well
accepted norms that prohibit the threat or use of force 9 and the direct
prohibition of propaganda in article 20 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights,40 but also because the United Nations has
34. "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what
measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore
international peace and security." U.N. CHARTER art. 39. See also id. art. 1, para. 1
(listing as part of the purpose of the United Nations the maintenance of "international
peace and security ... [and] the prevention and removal of threats to the peace").
35. Article 2 provides: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state .... ." U.N.CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
36. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 29, para. 2, G.A. Res. 217, 3 U.N.
GAOR 74, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 77 (1948).
37. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, entered into force March
23, 1976, art. 19, para. 3, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (no. 15) at 55, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1967).
38. Article 20 prohibits "propaganda for war" or "[a]ny advocacy of national, racial
or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence." Id.
art. 20.
39. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, paras. 3-4; see also Military and ParamilitaryActivities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 14 (enunciating rules
of customary international law).
40. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 37, art. 20.
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declared repeatedly (and often unanimously) that such propaganda must
be prohibited. In 1947, for example, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution condemning all forms of propaganda "designed or likely to provoke or encourage any threat to the
peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression." 4 These same words
later appeared in another United Nations Resolution entitled "Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space"4' 2 and also in the 1966 Outer Space
Treaty.4 3 States are also prohibited from employing propaganda for war
or aggression in the now famous 1970 General Assembly resolution,
"Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations."4 4
Finally, some regional agreements reinforce this principle of international law. Specific examples include article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights, which denounces propaganda promoting war
and makes such propaganda a candidate for prior censorship,4 5 and the
1975 Helsinki Final Act, which places on states a duty to refrain from

41. G.A. Res. 110, U.N. Doc. A/519, at 14 (1987).
42. G.A. Res. 1962, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 15) at 15; U.N. Doc. A/5515
(1964).
43. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 2412, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205, 207.
44. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 124, U.N. Doc. 2/8082
(1970).
45. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 13, O.A.S.T.S. No.

36 (entered into force July 18, 1978), reprinted in

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

190.1, 190.5-.6 (R. Lillich ed. 1986). See also Charter of the Organization of American States, art. 15, April 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 2419-20, T.I.A.S. No.
2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 48, 56. Article 15 provides:
No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for
any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The
foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements.
Id. Article 16 further provides: "No State may use or encourage the use of coercive
measures of an economic or political character in order to force the sovereign will of
another State and obtain from it advantages of any kind." Id. art. 16, 2 U.S.T. at 2420,
T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. at 56. Under the Rio Treaty, intervention through
propaganda is also considered aggressive if the propaganda affects the inviolability or the
integrity of a member's territory, or its sovereignty or political independence. See InterAmerican Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), opened for signature Sept. 2,
1947, 62 Stat. 1681, 1701 T.I.A.S. No. 1838, 21 U.N.T.S. 77, 97-99.
INSTRUMENTS
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propaganda for wars of aggression."
It is with the background of the above normative statements that the
provision of the UNESCO Mass Media Declaration 47 should be understood. This document, which has become a very important component of
the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO), recognizes the important contributions of the mass media both in countering
incitement to war and in strengthening peace and international understanding."8 In fact, the Mass Media Declaration repeatedly emphasizes
the necessity of avoiding or restraining communicative actions that are
intended to, or have the functional consequence of, inciting war and aggression and generally disturbing the peace. It is in this sense that some
have argued that there is nothing drastically new about the Mass Media
Declaration, for it merely collects together and systematically presents
existing norms of international law that, until now, have been scattered
over many documents and declarations." 9
All in all, one can safely conclude that the prohibition against propaganda having the capacity to provoke war or, in a general sense, disturb
peace has been reaffirmed often as a norm of international law. Such
propaganda may appear in various forms: the direct incitement of war
(for example, by advocating the overthrow of the existing internal political order); the controlled use of information to revile and degrade the
institutions or agents of a community to such a level that the likely result
is a serious breakdown of peaceful coexistence between the states concerned; or the deliberate placement of false information, which often produces unpredictable consequences for relationships among communities.
These prohibitory constructs all seem directed to one major goal: the
maintenance of "minimum public order." 5

46. Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Final Act, Aug. 1, 1975,
reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 1292, 1297 (1975).

47. Mass Media Declaration,supra note 22.
48. See id. art. 1; art. 2, para. 3; and art. 3, para. 1.
49. "This instrument [the Mass Media Declaration] only appeared to place qualitatively new elements on the agenda of international communications and politics; in fact,
it was only a collection of norms and principles, most of which already had been enunciated in U.N. documents and indeed in international law. The only major innovation to
the credit of UNESCO was that the declaration brought together the various standards
scattered throughout earlier instruments." Nordenstreng, Defining the New International Information Order, in WORLD COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 14, at 30.
50. For a description of "minimum public order," see M. McDoUGAL & F.
FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 1-36 (1961). For similar
views of the regulation and management of propaganda as a major objective of the maintenance of minimum public order, see B.S. MURTY, PROPAGANDA AND WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER 142-81 (1968); O'Brien, InternationalPropagandaand Minimum World Pub-
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This Article, however, will do more than simply restate what have
been accepted as principles of international law against some forms of
propaganda. Rather, it will shift the discussion of propaganda away
from its general preoccupation with simply minimizing the possibility of
war and explicit coercion to one of promoting national self-determination. 1 In so doing, the Article seeks to achieve two goals. First, it will
extend the notion of propaganda to include distorted or selectively false
information that may potentially result in the structural negation of national or communal capacity for self-determination. Second, the Article
will suggest that establishing self-determination as a legal construct will
broaden the utility of international propaganda restraints beyond those
situations included under the concern for minimum public order, thereby
enchancing the ability to see the rights of both the victim and target
audiences in a positive rather than a negative way. The prohibition of
propaganda, thus, will do more than help ensure that precarious balance
in peace is maintained. It will recognize that propaganda is manipulative, anti-dialogic, and geared toward domination and conquest.52

lic Order, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 589 (1966).
51. Broadly defined, self-determination in international law refers to a people's right
to constitute its community without external interference, and to participate freely and
fully in all spheres of community life (whether the relevant community is defined to be
national or international). Thus, self-determination has two aspects: the right of participation as well as the right of constituting the community within which such participation
is possible. Put simply, self-determination is the negation of political, economic, and cultural domination and conquest.
Self-determination is an important normative principle enshrined in the U.N. Charter,
see U.N. CHARTER arts. 1, 55-56; and in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, see supra note 37, art. 1; and is accepted by the U.N. itself, see, e.g., Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation
Amoung States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625,
25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.18) at 121-24 U.N. Doc. A/8018 (1970). Most prominent

scholars likewise share this view. See, e.g., I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 513 (3d ed. 1979); U. UMOZURIKE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 271 (1972); Reisman, The Case of Western Somaliland: An International Legal Perspective, 1 HORN OF AFRICA 13, 18 (1978).
52. Domination is achieved by the denial to the audience of accurate and balanced
information upon which it can make rational decisions. Propaganda is geared toward
conquest because, by its very nature, it attempts to transform individuals and groups
(namely, the audience) from acting, thinking and self-reflecting beings into "things" that
can be molded according to the interest of the propagandist. The only relationship that
exists between the propagandist and his audience is one of domination and conquest. For
an interesting formulation of anti-dialogic actions with domination and conquest, see P.
FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED 60-65, 96-150 (1970).
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V.

SELF-DETERMINATION AND PROPAGANDA

As noted above, propaganda may include both intentionally false and
selectively false information. The disseminator may employ propaganda
to undermine the legitimacy of social and political institutions. Even absent such malevolent desires, however, the functional consequence may
be the same-the structural negation of self-determination.
In addition to the firm legal foundation supporting the prohibition
against propaganda, the concept of self-determination could also be employed to make propagandistic communication impermissible. This is because any explicitly coercive communication that intentionally and selectively disseminates false information with the explicit goal of unilaterally
and manipulatively altering the cultural and socio-political structures of
communities is a direct negation of those communities' right to determine
their cultural, social, and political affairs according to their needs, aspirations, and current conditions. The possession of accurate information is
clearly the minimum condition for the actualization of self-determination.
This section will explore two areas of propaganda that have never
attracted sufficient inquiry. Part A will outline one type of intentionally
false propaganda, disinformation, and consider its effects upon national
and communal self-determination. Part B will then analyze structural
propaganda, again with a view toward the deleterious effects of selective
information upon self-determination.
A.

Disinformation

Disinformation is a term applied to the process of spreading or implanting false information about individuals, groups, organizations, or
nations by a party that typically conceals its identity by attributing the
information to another source.5" Adopted in 1955 from the Russian word
dezinformatsia," disinformation is distinguished from other forms of in-

53. "Intelligence operations and propaganda can generally be grouped into three categories; white, black, and gray. White are openly attributed and refer to acknowledged
government positions, policies, and statements. . . Black operations are falsely attributed; they may include planting false stories, surfacing forgeries, and broadcasting radio
programs from clandestine transmitters. Gray affairs fall somewhere in between and in-

clude the use of front groups, local communist parties or media manipulation." Hearings on Soviet Active Measures, supra note 8, at 48 (statement of C. Thomas Thorne,
Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary for Coordination, Intelligence, and Research, Department of State). This section will focus on "black" propaganda, better known as disinformation.
54. See R. SHULTZ & R. GODSON, DEZINFORMATSIA: ACTIVE MEASURES IN SO-
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tentional propaganda, as well as structural propaganda, primarily because the disinformer conceals its identity. 5 The disinformer, usually a
state agency although sometimes private media, often employs forged
documents to support its disinformation enterprise. These forgeries run
the gamut from letters to telegrams to manuals.
Disinformation also should be distinguished from misinformation.
While the former pertains to outright lying and concealing of sources,
the latter involves wrongly or badly informing. With disinformation,
truth is deliberately and totally displaced by falsehood. On the other
hand, with misinformation, truth is not conveyed accurately, but the inaccuracy is not intentional.
Although disinformation is most often used by the two superpowersto
undermine each other's position vis-a-vis their respective allies and other
governments, disinformation also adversely affects the capacity of other
communities (mainly developing countries) to strengthen the social, cultural, economic, and political components of nationhood. Disinformation
hinders developing countries' capacity for self-determination in two
ways. First, even when the superpowers use disinformation to undermine each other's position, they quite often use weak and vulnerable
countries as their bases of operation, treating them as manipulable objects through which foreign policy is conducted. Second, developing countries are often direct targets and victims of disinformation, especially
when they are seen to be either unfriendly or too independent in their
perceptions and appraisals of their needs and priorities.
Both of the above objectives have been pursued numerous times. Yet
specific instances of disinformation seldom are proved because highly sophisticated means are used to attribute the information to fraudulent
sources and because most developing countries lack sufficient resources to
track down and reveal the true source. Consequently, most of the false
information must remain either believed as true or on a level of unverifiable suspicion. Nevertheless, a few well-known examples indicate how
the process works.
One well-known case arose during the destabilization of the Allende
Government in Chile. The United States Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) continually utilized local media, especially the major conservative
Santiago daily newspaper, El Mercurio, to plant false information about
both the condition of the economy and the relationship between the army
and the Chilean Government. These conditions ultimately developed in
the way the CIA alleged and desired, finally leading to the bloody overVIET STRATEGY 2,

55.

Id.

36-37 (1984).
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throw of Allende. 6
Angola was another target of CIA disinformation during the 1970s.
John Stockwell, a former CIA official who served as the Chief of the
Angola Task Force, details the Angolan operation in his book, In Search
of Enemies.5 7 Stockwell cites one incident in which CIA officers in Kinshasa, Zaire fabricated a story about Cuban soldiers raping Angolan
women and killing babies. The CIA sought to discredit the Cuban troops
who were aiding the Angolan Government.5 8 The story received fairly
extensive coverage by international news agencies, including the Associated Press and United Press International, and was reported in many
papers.
Nicaragua has been another victim of superpower disinformation. Alexander Cockburn reports that on the night of the 1984 United States
election, the White House leaked information to a reporter about an alleged shipload of Soviet Mig fighters nearing Nicaragua. This false information might have had the desired effect of diverting the United
States press from covering the Sandinista Government's first election,
which was taking place at the time of the United States election.59 In
addition, the Reagan Administration's repeated charge that the
Sandinista Government traffics drugs is now accepted as another endeavor to disseminate false information to rally the United States public
in support of the administration's policy toward the Sandinistas.
The CIA and the United States Government do not have a monopoly
on destabilizing and eventually undermining developing countries and

56. See Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities: Covert Activities, 94th Cong. 1st Sess.
(1976) [hereinafter Church Committee Hearings]; Borosage & Marks, Destabilizing
Chile, in THE CIA FILE 79-89 (1976); Landis, CIA Media Operations in Chile, Jamaica and Nicaragua, 16 COVERT ACTION: INFO. BULL. 32-43 (1982).
According to the Senate Select Committee Report, the CIA spent $8 million for propaganda and other activities on behalf of friendly political parties. The CIA spent another
$4,300,000 on producing and disseminating propaganda and supporting mass media.
Church Committee Hearings,supra at 37. "The covert propaganda efforts in Chile also
included 'black' propaganda. In the 1970 election of Chile, for instance, the CIA used
'black' propaganda to sow discord between the Communists and the Socialists and between the National Labor Confederation and the Chilean Communist Party." S.
KUMAR, CIA AND THE THIRD WORLD: A STUDY IN CRYPTODIPLOMACY 148 (1981).
57. J. STOCKWELL, IN SEARCH OF ENEmIEs: A CIA STORY (1978).
58. Id. at 195. The Reagan Administration reportedly engaged in a similar series of
disinformation tactics from 1981 until 1986 in order to destabilize the Libyan Government and ultimately to justify the bombing of that country. See Cockburn, Is Press
Awakening to Reagan's Deceptions?, Wall St. J., Nov. 13, 1986, at 33, col. 3.

59. Id.
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using them as pawns in the "great tussel" between the superpowers. The
Soviet K.G.B. (and indeed the entire Soviet machine) does it as well, if
not better. For the Soviets, disinformation is part of a total strategy
called "active measures," which is a literal translation from the Russian
phrase aktivnye meropriyatiya. This refers to a range of operations intended to affect other nations' policies, as distinct from conducting intelligence and counter-intelligence activities.60 These activities include disinformation, manipulation of media in foreign countries, and the use of
groups and institutions in other countries. 6"
One prominent example of Soviet disinformation concerned Pakistan's
American-run Malaria Research Center in Lahore. In 1982, the Soviet
paper LiteraturnayaGazeta reported that it had evidence that the program was actually a CIA-financed plot to breed special mosquitoes
"which infect their victims with deadly viruses as part of U.S. plans to
introduce biological warfare into Afghanistan." 2 Tass, the official Soviet
news agency, carried the report, which was also featured in such papers
as The Times of India and the Pakistani daily Jang63
Another incident involved a forged dispatch from the German Embassy in Accra, Ghana, which reported an alleged conversation between
the German Ambassador and his American counterpart. In the dispatch,
the German Ambassador quotes the American Ambassador, who allegedly complained that his intelligence service had taken too long to carry
out its mandate of overthrowing the Ghanian Government of Jerry
Rawlings." This dispatch appeared in the Ghanian press and was a
source of tension between the two countries. One may surmise that East
German officials forged the dispatch, one suspects with a request from
the Soviet Union.
In 1985, a forged letter purportedly from the American general in
charge of the Inter-American Defense Board to President Pinochet of

60. Hearings on Soviet Active Measures, supra note 8, at 47 (statement of C.
Thomas Thorne, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary for Coordination, Intelligence and Research, Department of State).
61. Id.
62. U.S. Dep't St. Soviet Active Measures: An Update, Special Report No. 101 3
(1982) [hereinafter Special Report No. 101], reprinted in Hearings on Soviet Active
Measures, supra note 8, at 184. This disinformation is believed to be the Soviet response
to a story (some would say disinformation) emanating from the United States that the
Soviets were using "yellow rain" (chemical weapons referred to as T2trichothecene
mycotoxins) in Afghanistan and supplying them for use in Laos and Kampuchea. Id.
63. Id.
64. See Special Report No. 110, supra note 8, at 5, reprintedin Hearingson Soviet
Active Measures, supra note 8, at 215.

1988]

INTERNATIONAL PROPAGANDA

Chile surfaced in Rome. The letter thanked Pinochet for the planned
deployment of Chilean military units in Honduras and El Salvador. An
Italian journalist found the letter on his desk. The journalist contacted
the relevant authorities, learned that it was a forgery, and did not publish it.65 The K.G.B. has also used media in Third World nations to
disseminate disinformation in its ongoing efforts to undermine its rival
superpower.

66

The situations described above illustrate the method and extent of disinformation operations. Such occurrences are not unique; however, they
highlight the type of incidents that unfortunately occur too frequently
throughout the world. As noted above, although the superpowers utilize
disinformation against one another directly or in their relationships with
their allies,67 developing countries are usually the victims of disinformation, both as direct targets of destabilization and as helpless pawns in the
power struggle between the East and the West. There are three reasons
for this. First, most developing countries do not possess the technological

65. Hearings on Soviet Active Measures, supra note 8, at 103 (testimony of Lucian
Heichler, Chairman, Inter-Agency Working Group on Soviet Active Measures, Department of State).
66. Ilya Dzhirkvelov, a former K.G.B. employee who now lives in England, recently
gave a glimpse as to how the K.G.B. goes about implanting disinformation. He specifically mentioned two "projects," one of which involved a developing country. The incident
concerned a Peace Corps project in Africa. Because the project was improving the United
States' standing in the region, the Soviets decided to undermine it. Dzhirkvelov claims
that he used a Ugandan journalist to plant a story alleging that the Peace Corps in East
Africa was the tool of the CIA. The report gained some credence, for one Peace Corps
volunteer was apparently a retired member of the United States intelligence service. Engelberg, K.G.B. Subversion Tactics Described, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1986, at A29, col.
4. The point here is not to dispute the possibility that the CIA used volunteers as informers. In all probability it did. Rather, one might simply observe that the K.G.B. did not
have such information, and that it was prepared to make it up.
67. For example, in November 1981 a forged letter from President Reagan to King
Juan Carlos of Spain informed the King that Spain must address two urgent problems:
(1) left-wing pacifists and opposition groups; and (2) Spain's reluctance to join NATO.
The message was deliberately expressed to offend Spanish nationalism. The forgery was
circulated on Nov. 11, 1981 to all delegations (except those from the United States and
Spain) of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe then meeting in
Madrid. Many Madrid papers ran the story and exposed the letter as a fabrication.
Special Report No. 101, supra note 62, at 1, reprinted in Hearingson Soviet Active
Measures, supra note 8, at 182. Numerous instances of forgeries have recently surfaced.
For example, in 1982 a forged letter and an accompanying one page intelligence study
purporting to be from William Clark, then Deputy Secretary of State, and dated shortly
before the Greek general election, suggested the need for an alternative to the Papandreou Government, and alluded to a possible military coup in the event of Papandreou's
reelection. Id.
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or the financial capacity to discover the falsity of such dissemination
before it occasions damage. Second, the precarious political and economic
positions of most developing countries make them vulnerable to adverse
influence and destabilization by such dissemination. Third, the plain fact
that journalism in these countries is often an unremunerative profession
provides the opportunity for the superpowers to use financial incentive to
the press in those countries to disseminate lies. Thus, the ultimate goal of
disinformation can be stated as the negation of individual or community
rights to self-determination.
Of course, international law generally prohibits such acts on the principles of noninterference in the internal affairs of sovereign states, the
maintenance of peaceful coexistence among states, and the right of selfdetermination of peoples, communities and individuals.6 8 Properly understood, the right of self-determination comprehends all of the above
rights. Noninterference' in the affairs of a community has no nobler
objective than that of ensuring that the community can control its
destiny. Peace cannot be maintained when a community is robbed of its
right to manage its affairs, especially when domination and manipulation regularly replace dialogic and interactive communicative action.
Unfortunately, to proclaim the illegality of something in current international social existence, as seems to be the case with disinformation, is
not to have achieved much. The lack of a central enforcement mechanism
marks the difference between a nod of agreement and a nod of sarcastic
commentary. Governments continue to condemn the disinformation activities of others while they engage in those very acts-and conveniently
deny them when accused. How to control such activity seems, therefore,
to be the crucial question.
Of course, self-help is one option. States can jam radio broadcasts and
stop further publication of what they suspect to be fabricated information. However, self-help is neither effective nor desirable insofar as the
developing countries are concerned."0 It is ineffective because these countries do not have the technological and financial capacities to effectively
monitor such information. It is undesirable because it is likely to lead to
a tighter control by the state of the communication process. The political
68. See Falk, CIA Covert Operations and International Law, in THE CIA FILE,
supra note 56, at 142-58.
69. Noninterference usually refers to interference that rises to such a level that it can
be termed "dictatorial interference": action whose objective is to dominate and prescribe
the actions of others. The process of domination may be direct and explicit or it may be
less direct and implicit. See generally Fatouros, Remarks on Covert Intervention and
InternationalLaw, 1975 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 192.
70. See infra Part VI, at 520.
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cost of such tight control would be too high and of doubtful value in its
capability to control disinformation.
Does this mean that we are doomed to the world of the disinformer?
The answer is clearly no. We can and must develop a way of combating
the circulation of intentionally false information. But that will require
the cooperation and commitment of all members of the international
community. The important point is that we go beyond the pious affirmation of the illegality and unethical nature of disinformation as a method
of conducting foreign policy and provide institutional arrangements
through which disseminators of such information are discouraged from
engaging in such activities. The political cost of implanting false information must become prohibitive.
The somewhat disconcerting tendency in international legal discourse
now is to readily grant the status of respectability to a particular act once
that act has been repeatedly performed by the leading players on the
stage of international relations. The logical terminus of such a perception
is that disinformation might become an acceptable process, for the identifying feature of the above tendency is to continually fuse law with behavior.71 Consequently, "norms lose their critical capacity" and powerful
dissenters seem "able to rewrite the norm."' 72 This is an obvious reaction
to the extreme positivism that has ruled legal theory both on the national
and international level and which sees legality as radically separate from
behavior, thus making it irrelevant. The two extremes-positivism and
cynical realism-should not, however, exhaust our knowledge or the possibilities of legality. The point is that, to be of any value, legality must
play a dual role: it must reflect our social behavior while retaining the
capacity to critically appraise that behavior.
Thus considered, legality will avoid either being a mere semblance of
social life or a set of formal rules oblivious and insensitive to our concerns and daily lives. To say that legality must play a dual role is to
maintain that, insofar as legality is to be of any value to us, it must
embody the two dimensions of our inquiry: an accurate and comprehensive description of our present social life (reality), and an account of the
alternative life (the possible). Neglecting one aspect of legality will make
the notion of law a means of post hoc justification for the status quo.
If the first dimension is emphasized over the second, then one creates a

71. See Reisman, Law from the Policy Perspective in INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS
3 (1981) ("The point is not who should be making these decisions according to certain
text, but who is actually making them.").
72. Kennedy, Book Review, 21 HARV. INT'L L. J. 301, 302 (1980) (reviewing L.
HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE (2d ed. 1979)).
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process through which the current distribution and appropriation of
power is taken to be reality and then given legitimacy. This is precisely
what international realism continually does; it takes the actors' appropriation of power not only as its point of departure, but as exhaustive of its
inquiry. It uses the notion of legality merely to perform the bureaucratic
baptism of legitimacy on those acts. If, on the other hand, the second
dimension is emphasized, the status quo is simply justified in a different
way. The real function of formal rules in relation to our daily lives is not
inquired into; the formal existence of laws is understood as a sign of
their effectiveness. Thus, the declaration of formal equality among states
while there is no provision for, and a total absence of, substantive equality in all areas of international life is actually a cruel joke rather than an
important regulatory scheme. Under this formalistic approach, the status
quo is legitimized through a cognitive dissolution of the gap between
"real life" and the function of formal rules.
This brief excursion into legal theory is included to put up a preliminary resistance against international realism, a theory that has been
gaining some currency and which holds the view that once the relevant
actors continually undermine a norm, that norm becomes legally "dead."
It is also meant to suggest that international legal positivism, which
clings to a set of rules whose connection to the social world is dubious, is
not helpful insofar as social behavior makes those rules irrelevant, if not
tragically comic.
B.

Structural Propaganda

Traditional analyses of legal regulation of propaganda have focused
on the intentionally false and on that which is explicitly intended to
undermine the legitimacy and functional capacities of communal institutions and agencies. This section will explore an area of information previously ignored under the conventional analysis of propaganda: structural propaganda, or the act of disseminating information which is so
selective and distorted that it can result in the structural negation of selfdetermination of some communities. Unlike intentional propaganda,
which is mainly performed by states or their agencies, structural propaganda is carried out by the international (mainly private) media. The
dissemination of such propaganda traditionally has been viewed as normal information flow consistent with article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Thus, it has not attracted the critical scrutiny of
those interested in propaganda.
Structural propaganda involves communicative action which, while
technically accurate, is so selective, unbalanced, and one-sided that it
produces a wholly inaccurate and incomplete understanding of the corn-
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munities and situations at issue. Although such information may not be
maliciously intended, it nevertheless has pernicious results. And in many
ways it is the most effective type of propaganda, because it relies on
framing 3 rather than falsehood, thereby creating the appearance of objectivity.
The selecting criterion for this information is a stereotypical and even
prejudiced view of the subjects of discourse. Thus, Western media tends
to cover developing countries from a point of view which sees the latter
as culturally primitive, administratively chaotic, inefficient, and seriously
backward.7 4 From such stereotypes flows a selection of information tending to reinforce those views. A developing country becomes of interest to
the international media mainly when it offers personalities like Amin or
Bokassa, 5 or events like a national disaster or a coup. A recent study
that examined how eight prestigious American newspapers covered the
three worlds (the First World, the Second World, and the Third World)
tersely concluded that "Third World coverage is skewed to the sen7 61

sational.1

73.

"Framing" includes selection, packaging, tone of presentation, and labelling. See
220 (1986).
74. A 1976 speech by the director of the Voice of America, Kenneth Giddens, is
representative. Giddens observed:
[T]here is a feeling among many of us involved in this enterprise that we are
engaged in helping to lift the veil of ignorance from the brows of masses of men
and women in almost every corner of the earth. If this sounds pretentious, even
boastful, I am sorry but I know that it is true.
Giddens, Censorship and Man's Right to Know: Implications of the TransistorAge, 93
VITAL SPEECHES 280, 282 (1977). Whether or not intended, media prejudice often surfaces. On November 29, 1984, for example, Tom Brokaw, the anchorperson of the NBC
Nightly News, posed a particularly revealing question to a correspondent who had just
finished reporting from London on the civil strife and famine then afflicting the Ethiopian province of Tigre: "You're back in London now which is one of the most civilized
and sophisticated cities in the world. Do you still have some kind of culture shock after
having just come out of that part of Africa?" NBC Nightly News (Nov. 29, 1984) (video
tape copy available at Vanderbilt University Television News Archive, Heard Central
Library, Vanderbilt University).
75. Idi Amin was the notorious dictator who ruled Uganda from 1971 until 1979.
Jean-Bedel Bokassa crowned himself emperor of the Central African Republic and ruled
that nation from 1965 until 1979. Both were simultaneously cruel and an embarrassment
to their people. The Western press was obsessed with these leaders, especially Amin, not
so much because of their cruelty, but because it found these leaders amusing and their
stories salable to its audience. The actions of these leaders reinforced the prejudices that
Western reporters have about that part of the world.
76. Potter, News from Three Worlds in Prestige U.S. Newspapers, 64 JOURNALISM
Q. 73, 78 (1987). "News coverage about the Third World ... is much more likely to be
sensational in nature, while the coverage of Western events is more likely to display a
M.

PARENTI, INVENTING REALITY: THE POLIrxCS OF THE MASS MEDIA
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In sum, structural propaganda may occur on two levels: first, in terms
of what the media chooses to communicate, which correlatively informs
what is excluded from the process of communication; and second, in
terms of how the media communicates what it has chosen to communicate, that is, how underlying cultural and political assumptions give an
incident its intelligibility and coherence.
The first level of structural propaganda results from a deliberate selection process. For example, the international media's virtually obsessive
preoccupation with the Amins of Africa means that the Nyereres7 7 of
Africa seldom enter the picture. Consequently, Africa enters the Western
consciousness as a continent capable of producing only the likes of Amin,
rather than one with successes as well as failures. It is not so much what
is included that makes the above act of communication propagandistic,
but rather what is left out-especially considering the lack of context
within which what is chosen is communicated. As previously stated, most
of what the international media disseminates about the developing world
revolves around disasters, coups, unusual leaders, or conference resolutions critical of the West. These societies are thereby presented at best as
places in which unusual and incomprehensible events take place, and at
worst as political and cultural opposites of the West.
The international media responds to such criticism with the argument
that it is in the nature of journalism that exceptional or unusual events
are selected. The media argues that its concentration on the Amins
rather than on the Nyereres, or on coups rather than on peaceful transfers of power, has nothing to do with the Western press' conception of
developing countries. This "journalism of exception" is seen as a defining characteristic of mass communication rather than an attitude toward
a culture or a group. In a sense there is some truth to this argument, for
journalism of exception permeates mass communication.
However, even apart from the issue of the desirability of journalism of
exception as a mode of communication, invoking it to defend the activities of the international media in relation to the developing world is unpersuasive. First, the international media reports proportionately more
negative exceptional events about the developing world than about the
developed world. Second, even if it were true that journalism of exception is equally applied to the two groups, it still has much graver conse-

balance between government stories and sensational stories." Id. at 276.
77. Julius Nyerere was the President of Tanzania from 1963 to 1985. He is a highly
respected, independent, and innovative (though not always successful) leader who embodies the best hope of the African Continent. But the Western media never found Nyerere
or his policies and endeavors newsworthy.
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quences for the developing world than for the developed world. Consider, for example, the reporting of a calamitous event. If the event
occurs in France (a developed nation), the receiving audience possesses a
reservoir of knowledge within which the event can be understood-and it
will be understood as an exceptional event. On the other hand, if the
event takes place in a developing nation, the event itself introduces the
receiving audience to that nation. Thus, for example, Uganda entered
the American consciousness through the exceptional events surrounding
Idi Amin. And, for most Americans, those events became the only available means through which they could define Uganda's identity. Journalism of exception, therefore, has produced structural propaganda by selectively reinforcing the prejudices of people in the developed world about
developing countries.
The second level of structural propaganda takes place at the level of
interpretation. Here the issue is how the cultural and political assumptions of the Western media about these societies-that they are backward
(politically as well as culturally) and chaotic-give an incident its intelligiblity; that is, how the event is transformed into a story congruent
with these assumptions. Thus, an American reporter who goes to the
Middle East with the assumption that Islam represents a resurgent atavism "which suggests not only the threat of a return to the Middle Ages
but the destruction of what is regularly referred to as the democratic
order in the western world," 78 readily interprets the anti-American sentiment in Iran as another example of Islam's attempt to negate modernism and modern (read Western) culture. Without these pre-existing assumptions, the Iranian situation could be explained alternatively as a
continued manifestation of the Iranians' resentment of how America put
the former Shah into power and how it enabled him to maintain power
for so long, despite popular dissatisfaction with his regime and policies.
At both levels of structural propaganda, what is at work is neither a
conspiracy nor a willful attempt to disseminate unbalanced information,
but rather cultural and political assumptions and prejudices that provide
the invisible frame within which events are selected, and through which
they are made intelligible to the audience.
Structural propaganda negates the right of self-determination of developing countries in two ways. First, developed nations often make major
decisions about developing nations on the basis of stereotypical and incomplete information,7 and this may seriously affect the political and

78.

E. SAID, COVERING ISLAM 51 (1981).

79. At the very least, such information orients the populace so that it can pressure its
leadership to adopt a particular policy toward the developing world.
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social life of developing societies. Second, because most of the information disseminated in developing countries is information largely selected
by the major Western news agencies, those communities are to some extent denied an accurate and balanced picture of themselves. Thus, there
are two ways in which these communities' self-determination can be undermined: Their interactive process and general relationship with other
communities are distorted, with negative social and political consequences; and their perception of their existing conditions becomes inaccurate and distorted. Both of these conditions and their consequences are
structural rather than intentional. However, their effect is, in significant
ways, very similar to intentional propaganda: they deny communities
substantively accurate information, the minimum condition for self-determination.
VI.

STATE RESPONSES TO PROPAGANDA

The potential responses to the forms of propaganda outlined above
vary according to the nature of the propaganda and the manner and
means of its dissemination. But generally, they fall into two groups:
those which can be taken unilaterally by the state, and those adopted
according to internationally agreed upon and coordinated procedures
through which the propagandistic message may be stopped or rectified.
This section will analyze the two major areas of state action, jamming
and ordinary censorship.
A. Jamming
Jamming is one of the most common ways in which states respond to
unwanted incoming information-including propaganda-if the means
of communication is radio. 0 Jamming involves the transmission of radio
signals on the same frequency as that of the contested broadcast so as to
make the broadcasting signals unintelligible. Two types of jamming exist: skywave and groundwave jamming. Where skywave jamming is utilized, the jamming party uses powerful transmitters stationed equidistant
from the targeted audience and the broadcaster. The jammer then radiates jamming signals into the ionosphere, which reflects the signals
across the path of the offending broadcast."' This can be very effective in

80. There are other less common methods states use to exclude or interfere with
foreign broadcasts. See Savage & Zacher, Free Flow Versus PriorConsent: The Jurisdictional Battle Over InternationalTelecommunication, 42 INT'L J. 342 (1987).
81. See Price, Jamming and the Law of InternationalCommunications, 1984 MICH.
Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 391, 399 n.1.
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shielding large areas from broadcast signals. Its effectiveness will obviously be limited when there are changes in the ionosphere; for example,
when the sun has set in the areas to which the signals are going, but is
still shining in the region where the broadcast originates. This is sometimes referred to as "twilight immunity." Groundwave jamming, on the
other hand, utilizes less powerful transmitters located near the intended
audience and radiates the jamming signal directly at the audience. This
is mainly used to block signals to large urban areas8 2 since the signal can
effectively blanket a twenty mile area.8" The jamming signal may simply
be irritating "noise," a distorted voice or music transmitted at the same
frequency.
Jamming of radio broadcasts began in the 1930s. During that decade
many European countries employed jamming as a method of response to
unwanted information."' Jamming was also used by both sides during
World War II. Since 1948, however, jamming has become substantially
an East-West8 5 phenomenon. When tension between the East and the
West increases, the former usually employs jamming to control what it
considers hostile propaganda emanating from the latter.8"

82. See D.

ABSHIRE, INTERNATIONAL

BROADCASTING:

A NEW

DIMENSION

OF

WESTERN DIPLOMACY 48-49 (1976).

83.

D.

SHANOR, BEHIND THE LINES

145 (1985).

84. Borra, The Problem of Jamming in InternationalBroadcasting,11 J. BROADCASTING 355, 357 (1967).

85. For purposes of this discussion, the terms "East" and "West" refer to the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries respectively.
86. The Soviet Union started jamming Voice of America (VOA) in 1948 when cold
war tension rose over the West Berlin issue. The ascension of Khrushchev and the deStalinization campaign brought temporary relaxation of both tension and jamming of
radio broadcasts from the West, although the CIA-financed Radio Liberty and Radio
Free Europe were still jammed. The Suez and Hungarian crises of 1956 led to renewed
jamming. There was some relaxation in 1963 following the entry into force of the Test
Ban Treaty. Following the Soviet Union's invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, however,
jamming was resumed. On the eve of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Soviet Union stopped jamming, but that was only short-lived as the
Polish crisis and the 1979 Afghanistan invasion brought in a renewed jamming process.
Since that time Soviet jamming of Western radio broadcasts has occurred intermittently.
See D. SHANOR, supra note 83, at 144-47.
Recently, the Soviet Union reportedly stopped jamming broadcasts of the BBC and

VOA. See Years ofJamming Voice of America Halted by Soviet, N.Y. Times, May 26,
1987, at Al, col. 4; Moscow Stops Jamming Voice of America, L.A. Times, May 26,
1987, at 6, col. 6. This is a sign that two things may be happening: (1) Gorbachev's
policy of glasnost (openness) is bearing fruit; and/or (2) the relationship between the
East and West is perceived to be relatively normal. A New York Times editorial, while
expressing satisfaction with the cessation of jamming against the BBC and VOA, chal-
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The legality of jamming is presently an unsettled issue. The strongest
legal argument against jamming is stated in the International Telecommunication Convention (ITO). 7 Article 35 of the ITC prohibits emissions intended to jam, or in any way unlawfully interfere with, authorized frequency which has met and continues to meet the ITC's technical
standards. 8 Major jamming powers like the Soviet Union are parties to
lenged Moscow to stop "all the illegal jamming [so that] the possibilities for cultural
exchange would enlarge, and the world would listen more closely to professions of glasnost." Message To, and From, Moscow, N.Y. Times, May 28, 1987 (editorial), at 22,
col. 1.
Some of the Soviet Union's Warsaw Pact allies also engage in jamming. See VOICE OF

2-3 (1980); Price,Jamming and the Law of InternationalCommunications, 1984 MICH. Y.B. INT'L L. 391; Note, Radio Propagandain the Contexts of
International Regulation and the Free Flow of Information as a Human Right, 5
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 154, 173 (1979) [hereinafter Note, Radio Propaganda].The
AMERICA, JAMMING

Soviet Union is said to spend approximately $900 million per year jamming radio broadcasts from the West. See Jones, In a Crisis, Whom to Tune in? In the Soviet Bloc,
Probably Western Radio, N.Y. Times, May 5, 1986, at 4; see also D. ABSHIRE, supra
note 82, at 49; Bethel, PropagandaWarts, HARPER'S, May 1982, at 19-20.
Cuba has apparently utilized jamming to negate the allegedly hostile and subversive
broadcasts of Radio Marti. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. Cuba's fears and
complaints are reinforced by observations of various people who oppose the Castro regime. According to the Executive Director of the Cuban-American National Foundation,
"[These radio broadcasts would be a part of a policy of containment of Castro, of protecting U.S. policy in the Caribbean." Cuban-American Nat'l Found., U.S. RADIO
BROACASTING TO CUBA 22 (1982), quoted in Feltman, supra note 18, at 83. Representative Toby Roth from Wisconsin put it a bit more bluntly: "Let's throw Castro out of
Cuba and give Cuba back to the Cubans." Mr. Roth perceived Radio Marti to be contributing to that goal. Id.
87. International Telecommunications Convention, Oct. 25, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 2510,

T.I.A.S. No. 8572 reprinted in INTERNATIONAL
AND INFORMATION: A COLLECTION OF BASIC
1982) [hereinafter BASIC DOCUMENTS].

LAW GOVERNING COMMUNICATIONS
DOCUMENTS

232-42 (E. Ploman ed.

88. Article 35 states in part:
1. All stations, whatever their purpose, must be established and operated in such a
manner as not to cause harmful interference to the radio services or communications of other Members or of recognized private operating agencies, or of other
duly authorized operating agencies which carry on radio service, and which operate in accordance with the provisions of the Radio Regulations....
3. Further, the Members recognize the desirability of taking all practicable steps
to prevent the operation of electrical apparatus and installations of all kinds from
causing harmful interference to the radio services or communications mentioned in
[this article].
Id. art. 35, paras. 1, 3, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 87, at 240. The
newest unpublished version of the Convention, adopted in Nairobi, Kenya on November
6, 1982 and entered into force for the United States on January 10, 1984, did not alter
any of the above provisions.
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the Convention, and hence theoretically bound by it. However, the administering United Nations agency, the International Frequency Registration Board (IFRB) of the International Telecommunications Union
(ITU),89 has only a mediating and conciliating role and must in fact be
invited by the disputants to assume that role. Moreover, because the
IFRB's recommendation can be rejected by either of the parties to the
dispute without those parties incurring any sanctions, the ITC's provision is not particularly strong in terms of discouraging intentional interference with signals.9 0
The 1979 ITU Radio Regulations91 provide similar proscriptions. Article 16(2), for example, forbids all stations from engaging in "unnecessary transmissions," "the transmission of superfluous signals and correspondence," "the transmission of false or misleading signals," and "the
transmission of signals without identification.
...
9' It can be argued
that jamming signals are "unnecessary" from the technical standpoint of
transmitting signals; that the sounds they emit are misleading; and that
they certainly are not identified or identifiable. Furthermore, article
16(3) instructs all stations to "radiate only as much power as is necessary to ensure a satisfactory service." ' However, like the ITC provisions, the Radio Regulations provide no credible means of sanctioning
offending parties; article 20(1) simply urges member states to exercise
"the utmost good will and mutual assistance in the application of the
provisions of Article 35 of the Convention and of this Article to the settlement of problems of harmful interference.""' Notwithstanding existing
procedures through which unauthorized and persistent interferences are
reported to centralized bodies and ultimately to the IFRB, there is no
mechanism for sanctioning a persistent offender.
Jamming as a response to unwelcome information emanating from external sources has been the subject of various other normative international statements. In 1950, for example, the General Assembly adopted a

89. The IFRB, which was established in 1947, is designed to ensure orderly utilization of the radio frequency spectrum. It is responsible for the implementation of the
Radio Regulations and the maintenance of "a Master Register for all frequency assignments made by the national authorities." BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 87, at 227.
90. See Note, Radio Propaganda,supra note 86, at 163; see also D. LEIVE, INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
THE RADIO SPECTRUM

AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE REGULATION OF

184-85 (1970).

91. The Radio Regulations, Final Acts of the World Administrative Radio Confernce (1979), reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 87, at 245-56.

92. Id. art. 16, § 2, reprinted in BASIC
93.

DOCUMENTS,

supra note 87, at 254.

Id. art. 16, § 3, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 87, at 254.
94. Id. art. 20 § 1, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 87, at 255.
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series of resolutions condemning the practice as inconsistent with the
right of all people to be informed.95 The United Nations Economic and
Social Council issued its own condemnation soon thereafter.96 However,
one General Assembly resolution indicates the ambiguous legal status of
jamming, at least in relation to propaganda. Following a general condemnation of jamming, Resolution 424 "Invites all governments to refrain from radio broadcasts that would mean unfair attacks or slanders
against other peoples anywhere and in so doing to conform strictly to an
ethical conduct in the interest of world peace by reporting facts truly and
objectively[.]" 97 This resolution raises a serious question: What happens
if a station (whether private or public) persists in disseminating any of
the above types of information? Is jamming permitted as a legitimate
response to such actions? In his widely cited treatise on international
law, Oppenheim advances the view that the exclusion of unwanted information is part of the sovereign's claim to full control over its territory. 8
The moral supplement to this doctrinal exposition is the feeling that
jamming offers the only practical method of excluding any form of propaganda that will undermine the self-determining capacity of communities
and nations. It is seen as the functional equivalent of stopping the
printed message at the borders.
Another view exists which, while condemning the practice of jamming
in general, will allow it as a form of self-defense in specific cases.

95. Report of the Economic and Social Council, 5(5) U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 3), at
62-63, U.N. Doc. A/1345 (1950); G.A. Res. 424, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 44,
U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950). The phrase "the right of all people" refers to article 19 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which declares that all people have a right "to
seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media without regard to
frontiers." Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 36, art. 19.
96. 11 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 5A) at 2 (1950). As adopted by the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council Resolution reads:
Considering that the duly authorized radio operating agencies in some countries
are deliberately interfering with the reception by the people of those countries of
certain radio signals originating beyond their territories... [and that] this type of
interference constitutes a violation of the accepted principles of freedom of information .... [the Assembly] condemns measures of this nature as a denial of the
right of all persons to be fully informed concerning news, opinions and ideas regardless of frontiers ....
Id. G.A. Res. 424, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 44, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950).

97. Id.
98. "The principle of exclusive sovereignty in the air space for the subjacent State,
which has received general approval ...enables that State to prohibit the disturbance of
the air space over its territory by means of Herzian waves caused for the purpose of
wireless communication and emanating from a foreign source." 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW

§ 197f, at 529 (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955).
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Bowett, for example, argues that,
[wihere the delict involves the broadcasting of propaganda the state may
have recourse to 'jamming', which may be illegal primafacie but justifiable as self-defence. Thus the decision of the British government to 'jam'
the broadcasts from Athens Radio in January, 1956, was justifiable as a
measure of self-defence against delictual conduct by Greece ....
The self defense argument is closely related to the sovereignty argument
in that the concept of self defense assumes the existence of a self: a community with its own identity and capacity to run its affairs. An external
and coercive interference with this community can be legitimately resisted and repulsed. The two positions differ only in the type of information excluded. Under the self defense argument, the range of excludable
information is much narrower. It must threaten and seriously impinge
upon the community's capacity to run its affairs. Thus, the self defense
argument will allow a great deal of the propaganda discussed above, for
the impact of that information on the complainant community is not always obvious or immediate.
International law arguably allows jamming in relation to certain kinds
of propaganda. Disinformation, hostile propaganda, and advocacy of national, social or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence cannot be considered protected by the right to
have "freedom to seek, receive and impart information."' 0° These forms
of propaganda negate rather than enhance a community's capacity for
self-development and self-determination. Disinformation denies people
the right to accurate information upon which they determine their relation with their social as well as physical environment. Hostile propaganda denies people the capacity for a balanced and reasoned interactive
process. The advocacy of hatred and discrimination negates people's
99. D. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 54 (1958) (footnote omitted). See also Glahn, The Casefor Legal Control of "Liberation" Propaganda,31 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 553, 582 (1966) ("[A]ny target state for subversive propaganda
possesses a perfect legal right to adopt jamming procedures against foreign subversive
transmissions. .. ").
Andrei Vishinsky, the Soviet delegate to the United Nations, presented a different
rationale for jamming when he admitted for the first time that the Soviet Union jams
Western radio broadcasts. Speaking before the United Nations General Assembly in November 1949, Vishinsky defended jamming of BBC broadcasts, arguing that the Soviet
Government feared the Russian people would react violently to the untruths. Such an
outcry, he asserted, would endanger peaceful cooperation between the Soviet Union and
Great Britain. Borra, supra note 84, at 358.
100. G.A. Res. 424, 5 U.N. GOAR Supp. (No. 20) at 44, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950)
(quoting Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 36).
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right to self-determination on two counts: It seeks to prevent those about
or against whom the discriminatory propaganda is aimed from being
treated with respect. Moreover, such advocacy tends to deprive those
people a legitimate role in the power process,101 because people frequently are excluded from effective participation in various sections of
social and political life on the basis of such information. In addition,
such propaganda totally denies the target audience access to accurate information on which to base its relationship with the victim of the propaganda. Hence, discriminatory propaganda provides the clearest example
of the anti-dialogic and manipulative interactive process that negates
rather than enhances a people's capacity for self-determination.
Notwithstanding the argument that jamming can be employed legally
to exclude certain types of propaganda emanating from external sources,
it is neither effective nor desirable from the developing countries' points
of view. Jamming is ineffective for four reasons. First, for most developing nations it is not a readily available means of control. These nations
have neither the financial nor the technological capacity to jam offending
broadcasts emanating from the powerful transmitters used by such stations as the Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Moscow. Indeed, most
developing countries cannot even reach one-third of their citizens, much
less jam powerful transmitters from radio stations in developed countries.
Second, the emergence of DBS as a means of international communication ensures that developing countries' capacity to control what they consider to be undesirable information will be further limited. In fact, given
the huge areas of DBS service and the prohibitive cost of the necessary
technology, jamming is unlikely to be even remotely possible.1 0 2 Third,

101. Discriminatory propaganda is explicitly and generally prohibited under international law. Articles 1(3) and 13(1)(b) of the U.N. Charter generally prohibit discrimination which is based on "race, sex, language, or religion." U.N. CHARTER, art. 1, para. 3,
art. 13, para. 1(b).
In addition, article 20(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
provides that "any advocacy of ... racial ... hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law." International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, supra note 37, art. 20, para. 2. The International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, openedfor signatureMar. 7,
1966, art. 4, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 220, also prohibits racial propaganda and calls on member states to prohibit such dissemination. Another United Nations convention urges state
parties to, inter alia, "adopt any legislative measures necessary to suppress as well as to
prevent any encouragement of apartheid and similar segregationist policies or their manifestations and to punish persons guilty of that crime." The International Convention on
the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, art. 4, G.A. Res. 3068, 28
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 166, U.N. Doe. A/9233/Add. 1 (1973).
102. Of course, the government could cut off "reception at the community receiver,"
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even if jamming were technologically and economically feasible, one
might argue that it could not legally be employed to exclude structural
propaganda, a major concern for developing countries. Because of its less
obvious and less immediate-though by no means less significant-impact, the international statements reviewed above might be
viewed as not authorizing such measures against structural propaganda.
Finally, most of the structural propaganda that concerns developing
countries is outgoing rather than incoming. It concerns the story told
about them in the developed world rather than the story that is told to
them. Jamming by its very nature is of no use against outgoing
propaganda.
In addition to being ineffective, jamming is also undesirable. Such
measures would undoubtedly breed a chaotic international broadcasting
process in which every nation would simply act on its suspicions by jamming any station it considered unfriendly. This would clearly undermine
international exchange and dialogue. Furthermore, jamming appears to
be a reactive and negative act. It lacks the capacity both to deal with the
structural issues that give rise to the undesirable interactive system and
to rectify the situation once undesirable propaganda has been disseminated.
B.

Ordinary Censorship

Ordinary censorship provides another means by which states may exclude incoming written propaganda. Both article 29 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights can be relied upon as the legal justification for accomplishing this. Article 29 provides that a state can restrict
freedom of information for "the purpose of securing due recognition and
respect for the right and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society."1 0 3 Article 19(3) of the Covenant also provides that the
right of freedom of information can be restricted "[f]or the protection of
national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health

and "forbid all home reception by banning the manufacture or importation of home reception antennas or adaptors." Note, Approaches To ControllingPropagandaand Spillover from DirectBroadcast Satellites, 5 STAN. J. IN' STUD. 167, 185 (1970). However, these procedures are costly, especially for developing countries, and, as noted
elsewhere in this Article, such procedures deny freedom of information by this total restriction. Moreover, they retard the technological development by restricting (or even
eliminating) its use.
103. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 36, at 77.
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and morals." 1° ' Many countries engage in such censorship to exclude
both incoming and internally-generated information seen as propagandistic.
Even the United States, a nation that usually assumes the posture of a
defender of the free flow of information, engages in such "stop at the
border" censorship. The McCarran-Walter Act, 105 for example, has
been used to deny visas to foreigners whose views the United States Government does not particularly appreciate. Section 212(a)(28) of the McCarran-Walter Act denies visas to foreigners who believe in or write
about communism or anarchism, or who belong to organizations that
promote those doctrines. 06 Under section 212(a)(27), the United States
Attorney General or a consular officer can deny visas to people who wish
to enter the United States "solely, principally, or incidentally to engage
in activities which would be prejudicial to the public interest, or endanger the welfare, safety, or security of the United States. 10 7 Many international figures have been denied entry into the United States under the
authority of these provisions. The list includes the Nobel Prize laureate
Gabriel Garcia Marquez of Colombia; the widow of the late Chilean
President Salvador Allende; Nino Pasti, a former four-star general in the
Italian Air Force and an expert on nuclear weapons; Dario Fo, a popular Italian playwright with a leftist tendency; and the renowned Belgian
economist Ernest Mandel."0 8
Successive governments of both parties have invoked the McCarranWalter Act to exclude people for ideological reasons, usually on the
ground that foreign applicants hold views that challenge the premise of a
particular foreign policy being pursued. In a nation that defines itself as
one committed "to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,"' 0 9 the McCarran-Walter Act-and
104. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 37.
105. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (current version at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-525 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)) [hereinafter McCarranWalter Act]. In December 1987, Congress suspended the ideological exclusion provision
of the Act; however, the amendment will remain in effect only through February 1989.
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-204,
101 Stat. 1399-400 (1987) (codified as note to 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1982). Congress has yet
to repeal the Act. Id. 101 Stat. at 1400. See Greenhouse, U.S. Ends Bid to Expel Mexican Leftist Writer, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1988, at 14, col. 1.
106. McCarran-Walter Act, supra note 105, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28) (1982).
107. Id., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(27) (1982).
108. Shapiro, Ideological Exclusions: Closing the Border to PoliticalDissidents, 100
HARV. L. REv. 930, 930 (1987).
109. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). See also Shapiro,
supra note 108, at 933.
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the manner in which it has been invoked and applied-appears to be a
"constitutional anomaly." 110 Although Congress appears to be increasingly uneasy about the Act, anti-communist sentiment remains sufficiently acute in this country, such that members are not "anxious to cast
a vote that might be portrayed as soft on communism by political opponents."'-"
The Foreign Agents Registration Act 112 provides another, less explicit,
procedure through which the United States Government attempts to censor incoming information at the border. The Registration Act requires
1 14
an "agent of a foreign principal" 1 3 to file all "political propaganda"

110. Shapiro, supra note 108, at 933.
111. Id. at 939. Shapiro further notes: "[T]he legislative status quo continues, less as
a product of affirmative choice than as an expression of the collective desire to avoid any
choice." Id.

112. 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-21 (1982 & Supp. 1988).
113. "Agent of a foreign principal" is defined as:
(1) any person who acts as an agent, representative, employee, or servant, or any
person who acts in any other capacity at the order, request, or under the direction
or control, of a foreign principal or of a person any of whose activities are directly
or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized in whole or in
major part by a foreign principal, and who directly or through any other person(i) engages within the United States in political activities for or in the interests
of such foreign principal;
(ii) acts within the United States as a public relations counsel, publicity agent,
information-service employee or political consultant for or in the interests of such
foreign principal;
(iii) within the United States solicits, collects, disburses, or dispenses contributions, loans, money, or other things of value for or in the interest of such foreign
principal; or
(iv) within the United States represents the interests of such foreign principal
before any agency or official of the Government of the United States; and
(2) any person who agrees, consents, assumes or purports to act as, or who is or
holds himself out to be, whether or not pursuant to contractual relationship, an
agent of a foreign principal as defined in clause (1) of this subsection.

Id. § 611(c).
114. "Political propaganda" is defined in part as:
any oral, visual, graphic, written, pictorial, or other communication or expression
by any person (1) which is reasonably adapted to, or which the person disseminating the same believes will, or which he intends to, prevail upon, indoctrinate, convert, induce, or in any other way influence a recipient or any section of the public
within the United States with reference to the political and public interests, policies, or relations of a government of a foreign country or a foreign political party
or with reference to the foreign policies of the United States or promote in the
United States racial, religious, or social dissensions, or (2) which advocates, advises, instigates, or promotes any racial, social, political, or religious disorder, civil
riot, or other conflict involving the use of force or violence ..... '[D]isseminating'
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with the Attorney General within forty-eight hours of its transmission.
The notice must include "full information as to the places, times, and
extent of such transmittal,"11 5 as well as "the relationship or connection
between the person transmitting the political propaganda or causing it to
be transmitted and such propaganda. . . ."6 In addition, the Registration Act gives the Attorney General power to prescribe additional regulation or restriction to ensure the protection of "national security and the
public interest." '
Even though the Registration Act does not specifically prohibit access
to these materials, the pre-transmission procedures it prescribes-plus
the ignominious label "political propaganda"-are meant to discourage
their transmission and to minimize their impact once transmitted. The
pejorative connotations of the words "foreign agent" and "political propaganda" provide a sufficient deterrent to potential sponsors and distributors in the United States. They also tend to minimize the credibility of
the message among the audience to whom it is communicated. 1 8 In other
words, such labels are intended to place a whole category of information
beyond the pale of legitimate discourse.1 9
This brief excursion into the methods and procedures through which
the United States Government excludes information from foreign sources

includes transmitting or causing to be transmitted in the United States mails or by
any means or instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce or offering or
causing to be offered in the United State mails[.]

Id. § 611(j).
115.
116.
117.

Id. § 614(a).
Id. § 614(b).
Id.

118. CanadianFilms and the Foreign Agents RegistrationAct: Oversight Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Civil and ConstitutionalRights of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary,98th Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1983) (statement of Susan W. Shaffer, Staff Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union) ("[P]eople in sophisticated towns like Washington,
D.C., have seen these movies. Upstate New Yorkers, however, may well be chilled by
looking at films that they know their own Government has officially classified as foreign
political propaganda."). Appearing before the same hearing, a Department of Justice
representative admitted: "[Ilt
is fair to say that the original act reflected a perceived close
connection between political propaganda and subversion. It is this original focus [on]...
the pejorative connotations of the phrases 'foreign agents' and 'political propaganda'
which has caused such misunderstanding over the years." Id. at 3 (testimony of D. Lowell Jensen, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice).
119. Among the films found to contain objectionable "political propaganda" are
three Canadian films that depict the dangers of nuclear war and acid rain: If You Love
This Planet; Acid Rain: Requiem or Recovery; and Acid from Heaven. Meese v. Keene,
107 S.Ct. 1862, 1864 n.3 (1987). In Keene, the Supreme Court found the Act's provisions permissible under the first amendment. Id. at 1870-73.
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is meant to highlight two points. First, even the United States, the harshest critic of the New World Information and Communication Order and
the principle of regulation inherent in that order, does in fact employ
methods of censorship at the border. The lofty principle of "free flow"
with which the United States Government has been clubbing those developing countries who push for international regulatory schemes gives
way to pragmatic political calculation when the stream changes course
and flows in the opposite direction. Second, as is apparent from the application of the above two Acts and the resulting exclusion of people and
information from the United States, a national attempt to regulate incoming information is likely to result in a wide and undesirable exclusion of information. Governments are likely to give national security a
very expansive meaning, usually equating governmental security with
the security of the nation or the polity. In other words, ordinary censorship is an undesirable response to propaganda. And for developing countries, ordinary censorship, like jamming, will not remedy their concern
over the propaganda disseminated about them in the developed countries.
Thus, for developing nations, unilateral state action in whatever
form-whether by jamming or by stopping information at the border-offers neither an effective response to propaganda, nor a desirable
means of enhancing the free flow of interstate information.
VII.

INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO PROPAGANDA

An internationally coordinated response to propaganda would provide
an obvious alternative to the rather chaotic and arbitrary unilateral measures outlined in the preceding section. An international response could
take various forms. An agreement regulating disinformation and hostile
propaganda might simply require states to prohibit that form of dissemination from within their jurisdictions and to punish the disseminators.
This course of action was initially urged upon the General Assembly in
its second session, and was also provided for under article 1 of the 1936
Broadcasting Convention.12 ° This approach seems to be an acceptable, or
at least less controversial, means of controlling hostile propaganda and
disinformation.
A. Prior Consent
Structural propaganda, at least in the area of broadcasting, could be
approached from a different perspective: a prior consent principle. The
concept of prior consent, which has become prominent in the context of
120. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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developing a legal regime to regulate DBS, suggests that the communicator obtain the consent of the receiving state prior to transmitting information to any territory within that state. The General Assembly of the
United Nations gave some legitimacy and programmatic content to the
prior consent principle on December 10, 1982 when it adopted a resolution concerning DBS."2 ' Although the 1982 resolution departed from
earlier drafts in that it does not specifically refer to "prior consent,1 12 2 a
reading of Principle 10, which deals with "Consultation and Agreements
between States," clearly suggests that "good faith consultations are required during which a potentially receiving State would be able to use
the objection of non-consent. ' 12 Thus, prior consent under Principle 10
envisions good faith negotiations between receiving and broadcasting
communities to establish institutional arrangements such that broadcasting across international boundaries will occur only after these agreements have been reached. If prior consent is understood solely as giving
the receiving state veto power over information entering its territory by
simply refusing to agree to an institutional arrangement, then it cannot
effectively reduce the structural propaganda that concerns developing
countries. Indeed, it will have a negative and restrictive impact on people's right to communicate.
Prior consent will be ineffective because it will not prevent the dissemination of objectionable propagandistic material in the country where the
broadcast originates or in other countries that do not object to the broadcast. 24 The victim state will still lack the means to counter the damage
occasioned by dissemination in other countries, especially if it is a developing country without the resources at the disposal of the broadcasting
state or entity.

121. Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct Television Broadcasting, G.A. Res. 92, 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at
98, U.N. Doc. A/37/646 (1982) reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 451 (1983). Although the resolution was adopted by an overwhelming margin (107 in favor, 13 against, and 13 abstentions), it failed to secure all but one of the principal space-resources states. Id.
122. The Soviet proposal, for example, sought to impose strict control over DBS
broadcasts that had not secured the agreement of the receiving state. See Draft Convention on Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for Direct
Television Broadcasting, U.N. Doc. A/8771 (1972); Report on the Working Group on
Direct Broadcast Satellites of the Work of its Fourth Session, 27 GAOR (2081 plen.
mtg.) at 5, U.N. Doc. A/AO.105/117, Annex 3 (1973).
123. Christol, Prospectsfor an International Legal Regime for Direct Television
Broadcasting,34 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 142, 149 (1985).
124. This is so even if there is an agreement by the broadcasting state or entity to
refrain from broadcasting to the territory of the receiving state whenever the receiving
state objects to such broadcasting.
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In addition to this ineffectiveness, prior consent is also very restrictive.
Conceptually, prior consent does not ensure participation in the communication process; it merely gives the receiving state the power of refusal.
And history dictates that authoritarian regimes are likely to err on the
side of refusing transmission, and to exercise that right more often than
is really required.

What is needed is not an ineffective and restrictive institutional arrangement such as prior consent, but rather an arrangement that will
strengthen and increase the participatory dimension in the domain of
international communication-an arrangement that will give developing
countries access to the international media. This would enable them to
communicate their version of the events, to correct the error inherent in
structural propaganda, and to supplement incomplete information.
B.

Right of Correction

We must abandon the cliches of the noble orator and the brave printer if
we are ever to understand our media as they actually operate within our
society. 2 5
The right of reply and the right of correction offer alternative means
of responding to international propaganda. 126 In fact, the two rights are
utilized quite frequently in both domestic and regional settings. 2 7 At the
125.

D.

LE

Duc,

BEYOND BROADCASTING 188 (1987).

126. The right of correction and the right of reply are, in principle, two distinct
types of responses. The right of reply generally covers those situations in which a person
or institution feels wronged or offended by a specific publication and demands that a
written reply appear in the same publication. The following conditions usually apply to
a right of reply: (1) the reply must appear with a minimum loss of time; (2) it must
appear in the same spot as the impugned text, without any omissions or interpretations;
and (3) the text of the reply must be approximately identical in length to the offending
text. The right of reply usually applies regardless of whether the offending publication is
accurate or inaccurate. The right of correction differs from the right of reply in two
respects: (1) the offending text must be alleged to be incorrect; and (2) the correction is
usually composed by the party that allegedly erred.
This Article will treat the two rights as complementary and refer to them jointly as a
right of correction. As argued above, however, international propaganda takes the form
of both selective distortion and outright lies. Thus, any response to such dissemination
must necessarily incorporate the traditional responses as defined by both the right of
correction and the right of reply.
127. An example of a regional right of reply appears in the American Convention on
Human Rights, which provides that:
Anyone injured by inaccurate or offensive statements or ideas disseminated to the
public in general by a legally regulated medium of communication has the right to
reply or to make a correction using the same communications outlet, under such
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international level, however, logistical problems have impeded such endeavors. Foreign individuals and communities simply do not have the
same access to media institutions as nationals, and are thus unable to
utilize this procedure meaningfully.
Nevertheless, the Convention on the International Right of Correction
(Correction Convention)12 attempts to institute this procedure on the
international level. The Correction Convention provides a right of correction when a "news dispatch" 12 9 transmitted by correspondents or information agencies from one country is published and disseminated
abroad and a contracting state contends that the report is false or distorted and "capable of injuring its relations with other States or its national prestige or dignity. . . ."130 In such a case, the aggrieved state may

issue a communiqu6 stating its version of the facts, without comment or
expression of opinion, to the state within whose territory the dispatch is
disseminated." The state receiving such a communiqu6 must release it

conditions as the law may establish.
American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 45, art. 14, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS at 190.6.
In 1974 the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted a resolution
recommending that member states provide for the right of reply "in the press and on
radio and television and any other periodical media." Res. (74) 26, On the Right of
Reply-Position of the Individual in Relation to the Press (1974), reprinted in 1974
EuR. Y.B. (Council of Eur.) 399, 403.
128. Convention on the International Right of Correction, Aug. 24, 1962, 435
U.N.T.S. 191 [hereinafter Correction Convention].
The first effort to create an international right of reply occurred in the 1920s. In 1929,
for example, the International Juridical Congress on Radio sought to extend to radio the
right of reply for the press which was then in use in many countries. In 1931, the International Federation of League of Nations Societies recommended that a right of reply be
made available to any state that objects to a press or radio report that was either "inexact
or calculated to disturb international relations." The International Federation of Journalists made similar observations at its meeting in Brussels in 1934. See Whitton, supra
note 31, at 614.
129. "News dispatch" is defined in the Correction Convention to mean "news material transmitted in writing or by means of telecommunications, in the form customarily
employed by information agencies in transmitting such news material, before publication,
to newspapers, news periodicals and broadcasting organizations." Correction Convention,
supra note 128, art. 1, para. 1. The concept of a right of correction is merely a transfer
to the international level of an institution that has been part of the national law of many
Western countries, and whose basic premise is embodied in the maxim audiaturet altera pars (the person referred to in a printed report should have the right to convey to
the readers his side of the question).
130. Id. art. 2, para. 1.
131. Id. The "dispatch" need not be transmitted by a correspondent from the territory of the state that wishes to issue the communiqu6. It may be dispatched from another
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as soon as possible (and at least within five days from the date of receipt)
to correspondents and information agencies operating in its territory and
to the headquarters of the medium whose correspondent authored the
dispatch in dispute, if the headquarters are located within the territory of
the country."3 2 If the request is not acted upon within the prescribed
time limit, the complainant state may ask the Secretary General of the
United Nations to give appropriate publicity to the information contained in the communiqu6 through channels at his disposal." 3 Another
option for a complainant state is to refer the case to the International
Court of Justice (ICJ).""
By and large, the Correction Convention has been ineffective for a
number of reasons. First, only a few states have ratified it, and only one
of these is a major power headquartering a dominant transnational agency and other transnational media institutions."' Because the international media is allegedly the source of most of the propaganda, and considering that most of the media is headquartered in the developed nations, an international right of correction without the participation of the
major powers becomes totally ineffective. Second, even if a contracting
party accepted the communique and passed it on to the concerned institution, there is no guarantee that the medium will publish or broadcast
it. Furthermore, in some countries the media might successfully claim
constitutional protection from carrying out such activities. This would
likely be the case in the United States.1 "
country, as long as it concerns the complainant state. Id.
The United States sought to amend the Correction Convention by limiting the right of
correction to a report transmitted from the territory of the state wishing to issue a communiquE, but its proposal was rejected because a "foreign correspondent can easily arrange to have a particular dispatch filed from a country other than the one in which he is
stationed. . . ." S. DePalma, Freedom of the Press: An InternationalIssue, Dep't St.
Publ. 3687, International Organization and Conference Series III, No. 43 (released Jan.
1950) at 7.
132. Correction Convention, supra note 128, art. 3.
133. Id. art. 4.
134. Id. art. 5.
135. Twelve countries have signed the Correction Convention, but only six have ratified it. France is the only major power to have signed it. Indeed, France's domestic legislation, the first of which appeared in 1819, provided the inspiration for the Correction
Convention as well as most national laws on this issue. Whitton, Editorial Comment: An
InternationalRight of Reply, 44 AM. J. INT'L L. 141, 142 (1950); see also Donnelly,

The Right of Reply: An Alternative to An Action for Libel, 34 VA. L. REv. 867, 885
(1948).
136. The print media in the United States might successfully claim a constitutional
right to refuse to carry a right of reply. In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,
418 U.S. 241 (1974), the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a Florida statute that
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If the communication institution refuses to publish the correction, the
aggrieved state is left with alternative rectification procedures that are
manifestly inadequate and unrealistic. The first option, in which the
complainant state asks the Secretary General of the United Nations to
give the communiquE appropriate publicity through the channels at his
disposal, offers little assistance. Because no defined institutional structure
exists within the United Nations system to accomplish this, such a requirement might simply burden the system with communiques (both legitimate and otherwise) without any clear procedure by which to evaluate and disseminate them. In addition, even if a legitimate complaint
received proper publication through a defined outlet and bureaucratic
scheme, nothing approaching the private mass media in range and influence currently exists in United Nations agencies to remedy the damage
caused by false or distorted information.
The second remedial alternative-taking the issue to the
ICJ-provides an unlikely and costly avenue of redress. Only the most
damaging and threatening propaganda will be taken to that court; and
once before the court, there is no guarantee that a remedy or rectification
will follow. The time required for a hearing and determination is quite
long and, as a result, by the time an order issues, the damage will often
be irreparable. And even if the damage could be rectified, the offending
party might disregard such an order, as recent events have clearly
demonstrated.137
In principle, the right of correction is a very useful mechanism which
should not be dismissed. The fact that the existing Correction Convention has not been effective only suggests that its text should be reformulated. The right of correction is an aspect of the right to communicate,
the right to supplement incomplete information, and the right to correct
false information. An international right of correction offers a number of
potential advantages. First, the remedy (at least the initial remedy) is
positive rather than negative. A right of correction renders assistance to
the complainant in terms of setting the story straight instead of punishing the offender. It is, therefore, much more compatible with the concept

provided a mandatory right of reply. The Court found that such a measure "operates as
a command in the same sense as a statute or regulation forbidding [the newspaper] to
publish specified matter" and thus intrudes "into the function of editors." Id. at 256,
258. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), however, the
Court recognized the right of reply in the broadcasting field. Tornillo is remarkable in
that the opinion simply does not refer to Red Lion.
137. See Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran
(U.S. v. Iran), 1979 I.C.J. 7; 1980 I.C.J. 3. See also Case Concerning Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14.

1988]

INTERNATIONAL PROPAGANDA

of the right to communicate than any other remedy. With a right of
correction, the general interests of peaceful international relations and
the establishment of facts converge with the individual and community's
right of freedom of expression. As Jerome Barron put it two decades
ago, "[tihe opportunity for counterattack ought to be at the very heart of
a [free expression] theory[.]" ' 38
Second, any government or private medium knowing that its utterances are subject to such public scrutiny might be more conscious about
the accuracy and propriety of its communication. Put simply, this international requirement might make the communicator a bit more self-reflective about his cultural and professional assumptions. The existence of
such an institution, if it enjoyed universal membership, might have a
salutary long-range effect.139 Ideally, the communicator would personally take steps to correct mistakes or to solicit points of view different
from the one presented, if that point of view is controversial. But it is
precisely because such steps are not normally forthcoming that an institutional arrangement such as the right of correction becomes necessary.
Thus, steps should be taken to strengthen that institution both textually
and in terms of enforcement.
The utilization of the right of correction should not be seen as restricting freedom of information. In the current international system, the underdeveloped majority lacks the means to present its version of events.
Giving this disenfranchized majority some form of access to the international media does not restrict freedom of information and the right of the
media. Rather, it opens the media up to an international exchange of
views, to an international dialogue, and to a true diversity of sources. In
other words, the right of correction offers access to the views of communities in developing countries-views which do not seem to be represented well in the normal course of information production and distribution.
The measures outlined above will become less important as the various communities develop to the point where they possess means of information powerful enough to enable them to disseminate their version of
events-where there will be a genuine diversity of views in the international marketplace of ideas. For that to happen, a sustained and coordinated plan in the area of informational infrastructure must be initiated
in many of the developing countries. In the meantime, institutions like
the right of correction must shoulder the burden of reducing the mono-

138. See Barron, Access to the Press-A New FirstAmendment Right, 80 HARV. L.
REv. 1641, 1658 (1967).
139. See Whitton, supra note 31, at 615.

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 21:491

logic tendencies of international communication institutions.
C. An InternationalMass Media Council
The question of enforcement procedures has always proved to be one
of the most difficult issues in international law. Noble principles and
high hopes often crumble under the heavy pressure of persistent offenders. Nevertheless, an effective international regulatory scheme must address the issue of enforcement and the institutional structures that define
it. Although the broader issue of general enforcement procedure demands
a detailed policy analysis outside the scope of this Article, the following
may provide a useful point of departure: the establishment of an agency
within the United Nations charged with investigating complaints regarding the interstate flow of information. Such an agency might take the
form of an international mass media council.14 °
1. Structure
The concept of a media council is not new. Such councils currently
exist, in various forms, in about fifty nations.14 In some nations they are
directly established by the government and included as part of the Ministry of Information. 42 In others they are established by the government
but comprised of independent members, 4 ' or created by the legislature
and staffed with non-governmental members.1 4 4 Media councils also appear independently of government sponsorship. They may be established
by publishers and journalists;14 5 or proprietors and journalists;"'6 or by
proprietors, editors and journalists. 4" Media councils thus fall into three
broad groups: (1) those that either consist of government representatives
only or include a good number of government representatives, with the
Minister of Information presiding; (2) those which form a single group
140. In a notable address to the General Assembly in 1958, President Eisenhower
made a similar suggestion, albeit in a limited context. He stated: "I believe that this
Assembly should ... consider means for monitoring the radio broadcasts directed across
national frontiers ....
It should then examine complaints from ... nations which consider their national security jeopardized by external propaganda." U.N. GAOR 3rd
Emergency Sp. Sess. (733rd plen. mtg.) at 8 (1958), reprinted in Whitton, supra note
31, at 612.
141. MANY VOICES, ONE WORLD, supra note 22, at 245.
142. E.g., Indonesia. See id.
143. E.g., Ghana. See id.
144. E.g., Italy. See. id.
145. E.g., Austria and Sweden. See id.
146. E.g., Federal Republic of Germany. See id.
147. E.g., United Kingdom. See id. at 246.
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of publishers, owners and journalists; and (3) those in which the general
public and the profession are both represented in varying proportion.14 8
Media councils represented by the first group are clearly undesirable.
A government-controlled council, for example, always runs the risk of
degenerating into a mouthpiece through which the government can intimidate a vigilant media. The second option, a media-controlled council,
injudiciously relies on the profession to scrutinize itself. Indeed, it is precisely because of existing doubts about media self-regulation that many
now call for institutions like the right of correction.
It appears, then, that a truly effective international mass media council should be based on a variation of the third method. The council could
be composed of members of the major journalists associations (from both
developed and developing countries), media owners, and prominent
members of the international community (appointed by the Secretary
General) noted for their knowledge and interest in matters of communication as well as for their objectivity and integrity. Among other duties,
the council would concern itself with the enforcement of codes of ethics
and the implementation of the right of correction.
The council could pattern its proceedings after the type of administrative judicial structures now found in many countries. Seeking the assistance of a media council would prove more advantageous to aggrieved
parties than petitioning the Secretary General's office, as prescribed in
the existing Correction Convention. 4 9 As an institution, the council
would have the confidence of the expression industry and professional
communicators, and would thus meet less resistance. In addition, a body
so composed would be more sensitive to the tradition of free expression
and could, therefore, more competently discriminate between frivolous
complaints and genuine cases of distortion and intentional misrepresentation. It will also provide the profession with an opportunity for selfevaluation since the media should benefit from the critique of its members.
Such a media council could also lessen the resistance from some developed countries, especially the United States, which may consider the
right of correction incompatible with constitutional provisions. A welldrafted right of reply with a media council as its chief component may
be constitutionally acceptable in the United States. One could argue that

148.

See generally id. at 245-246 (discussing the establishment and function of media

councils);

J. C.

JONES, MASS MEDIA CODES OF ETHICS AND COUNCILS: A COMPARA-

TIVE INTERNATIONAL STUDY ON PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS (1980) (comparing ethics

codes of various countries).
149.

See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
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the Supreme Court's decision in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo50° did not prohibit a right of reply as unconstitutional regardless of its form, but rather that the Florida statute was flawed in that it
was over-broad, requiring a right of reply for almost all commentary and
mandating newspapers to print any reply. A revised international right
of correction could avoid such broad access. And the existence of the
council, with media representatives on it, is likely to provide access only
when it is needed.
A mass media council would also be viewed favorably by the Third
World because the council would consciously incorporate representatives
from developing countries. The council would thus lessen developing
countries' ever present anxiety that international institutional arrangements in this field, and indeed in many other fields, seem to somehow
leave them behind.
The very existence of such an institution, and the possibility that the
activities of states and communication institutions will be scrutinized by
an independent international body, might cause disseminators of information to consider more carefully their more offensive activities. Although some will undoubtedly pursue their activities irrespective of such
an institution, most will likely restrain themselves in order to avoid negative publicity.
Critics may contend that the steps here advocated are inadequate to
deal with the manifest problems facing developing countries in terms of
having access to the international media. Specifically, they may argue
that, given the representation -of the media owners and journalists associations, many legitimate complaints might be dismissed as frivolous. If
this were the case, the council would become less a regulatory or adjudicatory body than a public relations office on behalf of the international
media,1" 1 "soothing troubled people [and] reassuring anxious ones." '1 52

150. 418 U.S. 241 (1974). See supra note 136 and accompanying text. Many have
argued that Tornillo did not foreclose access altogether. See generally J. BARRON, PUBLIC RIGHT AND THE PRIVATE PRESS (1981); B. SCHMIDT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS VS.
PUBLIC ACCESS (1976); Note, Access to the Press:A Teleological Analysis of a Constitutional Double Standard, 50 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 430 (1982).
151. For a similar observation about a national media council, see O'Malley, Regulating Contradictions: The AustralianPress Council and the "Dispersal of Social Control," 21 LAw & Soc. REV. 83, 100 (1987). For a general theoretical argument that
such agencies might in fact represent those they ostensibly regulate, see M. EDELMAN,
THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS (1964); Abel, The Contradictionsof Informal Justice, in THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE (1982).
152. O'Malley, supra note 151, at 100 (quoting 1983 AUSTRALIAN PRESS COUNCIL
ANNUAL REPORT 51).
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The danger of this happening is real, but it is not inevitable. It will
depend in part on the integrity, influence and commitment to broaden
the right to communicate of those appointed to the council-especially
the non-media members. But it will also depend on the amount of support given to the council by various members of the United Nations. In
any case, even among press owners and journalists, there is some diversity of views about the notion of press responsibility and the concept of
the right to communicate. One can never assume the existence of a totally monolithic media. 5 ' Even the journalist members of the council
will likely have different approaches to the issue. Thus, the council
would be a useful step for their expression and, because the journalists
and owners on the council would represent different cultures and political backgrounds, the fear of a monolithic press is less troublesome. Even
if the council is not as effective as desired in terms of adjudicating most
complaints, its existence would certainly curtail some of the excesses of
the industry.
2.

Procedure

A mass media council could provide relief under a fairly simple procedural framework. When a government, institution, or individual alleges
that a publication or broadcast has either falsely represented or grossly
distorted the truth, it must first inform the particular medium of its specific complaints and ask that medium to correct its mistake or supplement the incomplete information disseminated. Alternatively, the aggrieved party may request the opportunity to present its version of the
events or supplement the incomplete information in a piece similar in
length to the offending piece to be carried by that institution. If the institution refuses to carry the piece, then the complainant can appeal to the
council with its allegation. If the council decides that no legitimate case
exists, then for all practical purposes the case ends. Of course, diplomatic
avenues as well as other judicial processes (e.g., a defamation suit) would
still be available. On the other hand, if the council decided that a case
existed and that the piece was false, distorted, offensive or damaging, the
council would ask the medium to correct it or give the complainant a
prompt opportunity to present its version. The medium should be ex153. A failure to recognize the internal diversity of capital, especially that coming out

of the competitive dimension of different corporations, leads to a wholly inadequate analysis of the nature of the problem at hand. For a critique of the tendency of radicals to see
a unity of capital in all spheres of social life and social interaction, see Jones, Class
Expression versus Social Control? A Critique of Recent Trends in the Social History of
'Leisure,' 4 HISTORY WORKSHOP 162 (1977).

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 21:491

pected to publish only those replies submitted by the offended party
within a reasonably short time and limited to information needed to correct the offending statement. In addition, the medium should not be required to carry a reply if that reply is in violation of the rights of third
parties or constitutes libel under the law in which the medium operates.
3.

Fact versus Opinion

Unlike article 2(2) of the existing Correction Convention,'" a worthwhile right of correction must not distinguish between fact and opinion.
This distinction is in many ways fictitious, for it suggests that facts concern cognition of the objective world, which apparently remains constant
regardless of the identity of the observer. Opinion, on the other hand, is
regarded as a normative assessment of what has been observed, which is
likely to vary according to the observer's social, economic and cultural
position. Within this positivist understanding, facts exhaust all cognition
and opinions and values are non-cognitive attitudes ill-suited to rational
discussion or resolution. Existing rights of reply or correction that distinguish fact from opinion are based on that assumption and generally ex15
clude the latter. 5
However prevalent the practice may be, the distinction between fact
and opinion is misleading. Except in the most trivial circumstances, what
one chooses to regard as fact is less a mirror of the world "out there"
than a result of a complex process of selection and interpretation informed by an invisible framework that Edward Said calls "communities
of interpretation,"'' 5 and that C. Wright Mills refers to as "the cultural
apparatus.' ' 15 7 News does not simply occur; pictures and ideas do not
154. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
155. In the United States, for example, the Supreme Court has drawn the distinction
between fact and opinion in libel cases. These cases indicate that the Court protects any
and all forms of opinion, and declines to protect what it calls "false statements of fact."
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the Court asserted:
Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of
judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas. But there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact.
Id. at 339-40. See also Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1127 (1985). In Ollman, the D.C. Circuit acknowledged that at times "the
richness and diversity of language" makes it difficult to make a distinction between assertion of fact and the expression of opinion. Id. at 977-78.
156. E. SAID, supra note 78, at 33-64. See also E. SAID, THE WORLD, THE TEXT
AND THE CRITIC (1983).
157. C. W. MILLS, The Cultural Apparatus, in POWER, POLITICS AND PEOPLE
406 (1967).
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merely spring from some ephemeral reality into our eyes and minds. In
selecting and appraising events, everyone is to a large extent saddled
with the particular conceptions of personality and society suggested by
the institutional arrangements within which he functions.
The fact versus opinion distinction is, therefore, not helpful. Every
fact is in many ways an opinion, for facts are informed by "implicit [and
unscrutinized] conceptions of personality and society."' " The distinction
is thus used to deny the possibility "that alternative descriptions [and
hence alternative conceptions of society and personality] are possible in
addition to those offered by the results of normal inquiries."' 5 9 To employ a certain method of inquiry and to choose certain ways of describing
ourselves and the social world in which we live naturally involves adopting an attitude, an expression of opinion. Because no methodology or
language is value-free, the distinction between fact and opinion becomes
utterly implausible and totally limiting. It makes it impossible for one to
see that discovering facts is, to use Rorty's expression, "one project of
edification among others,"' 60 a choice with normative content.
Once it is admitted that the distinction between fact and opinion is
unpersuasive, then it makes very little sense to provide for a right of
correction that deals exclusively with so-called facts. The right of correction considered here shall therefore encompass both facts and opinions. 6 '
4.

Enforcement Powers

Considering that the right of correction should not distinguish fact
from opinion, and also that the council should have the authority to instruct the medium to carry a reply or correction about an opinion or a
fact, the next issue concerns the council's proper course of action in the
event that a medium refuses to comply with an order to publish or
broadcast. The council might pursue various options depending on the
seriousness of the publication and the number of prior offenses by the
particular institution. It might simply publicize the offense and the general activities of the institution to exert pressure on the offender. Or, if
the activity appears particularly egregious, it might urge major journalist

158.

R. UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY: ANTI-NECESSrrARIAN SOCIAL THEORY IN THE

SERVICE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY 353 (1987).
159. R. RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE

363 (1979). Such

"normal" inquiries are usually identified with current institutional arrangements.
160. Id. at 364.
161. The French right of reply also makes no distinction between fact and opinion.
See Errera, Press Law in France, in
PARATIVE STUDY

PRESS LAW IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES:

137 (P. Lahav ed. 1985).
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organizations and agencies not to cooperate with that institution. Alternatively, the council might seek assistance from the government or the
national media council (or its equivalent) of the country in which the
offending institution resides. The council could inform the latter institutions about the alleged activities and the council's verdict and ask them to
exert pressure on the institution to desist from carrying false or distorted
information. Any variation of these procedures will enable the council to
take sanctioning steps.
The council might also play the role of appraising and reporting annually upon the performance of the international media. This might
serve both as a means of informing the international community about
the ethical and functional standards of the media on the international
level as well as offering another means of pressuring the media to raise
its ethical and functional standards. This approach could prove quite
useful, for no matter how arrogant and dismissive an institution may
appear, it will always seek to avoid a negative evaluation.162
VIII.

RIGHT OF CORRECTION AND MEDIA COUNCIL AS ASPECTS OF
ACCESS TO THE INTERNATIONAL MEDIA

[W]e want institutions which are both free and responsible.'6 3
Some have a tendency to see institutions as having a life of their own
apart from the human beings who created them and the purposes they
are designed to serve. In the United States, for example, the constitutional prohibition against any law abridging the freedom of the press"'
is sometimes taken to mean that the press has a constitutive rather than
an instrumental right. The press is seen to have this right by virtue of its
existence as an institution16 5 rather than because freedom of the press is

162. "[I]t is one of the most persistent and pervasive phenomena of international
affairs that no nation state . . .wants to stand before the world community as a lawbreaker." Larson, supra note 23, at 441. The state may deny the existence of a law or
interpret it in a suitable way, but it will not want to be seen as breaking the law. Id.
163. R. WILLIAMS, COMMUNICATIONS 151 (1967).
164. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
165. The most absolutist position was held by Justices Hugo Black and William
Douglas. Although the absolutist position did not command a majority of the Court, it
has influenced the direction of the Court and the parameters of the debate in a significant
way. See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 61 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) ("[I]
believe that the First Amendment's unequivocal command that there shall be no abridgement of the rights of free speech and assembly shows that the men who drafted our Bill
of Rights did all the balancing that was to be done in this field."). Ginzburg v. United
States, 383 U.S. 463, 491 (1965) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe First Amendment
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a prerequisite for the achievement of certain human values. If one sees
the right as constitutive, and if the right has been conferred on the institution through the positive laws, then the mere invocation of that right
closes the debate. On the other hand, if one sees the right as instrumental, then the invocation of that right, even when that right was granted
through positive laws, does not end the inquiry. Another question must
follow: Has the institution utilized the right to achieve the human values
for which it was created? If the answer is no, then public intervention to
make the institution more responsive and sensitive to those human values
is essential.
Thus, to treat the freedom of the press as inviolably constitutive is to
be ahistorical and oblivious to the fact that such institutions are created,
and "freedom" is conferred up on them, so that they may enable others
to realize certain values. It serves to reify these institutions, to see them
and the manner of their organization as inevitable rather than as the
product of human action with certain purposes in mind."' 6
Once the freedom of the press is seen in an instrumental sense, the
next question becomes: What purposes is this right meant to serve? Traditionally, three purposes have been identified with this right: the discovery of truth, the promotion of self-government and the promotion of selfdetermination."' We might add also the unique role of the international
media in creating understanding among peoples of the world. Propaganda, as practiced by the international media (both intentionally and
structurally) in relation to developing countries, does not advance the
achievement of any of these goals. In fact, in many ways it negates them.
Consequently, insofar as the right of correction and the international
media council are seen as ways of ensuring that people from developing
countries have access to the international media, such public intervention
allows all ideas to be expressed-whether orthodox, popular, offbeat, or repulsive.").
166. See P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY
89 (1967); LuKAcs, Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat,in HISTORY
AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS 83 (R. Livingstone trans. 1971) (Reification is the "apprehension of human phenomenon as if they were things, as a non-human facticity"); see
also Pitkin, Rethinking Reification, 16 THEORY AND SocIETY 263 (1987).
167. For a "truth"-based defense of free expression, see J. S. MILL, ON LIBERTY
75-118 (G. Himmelfarb ed. 1974). See also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Perhaps the most prominent defense of free expression
on the grounds of self-government appears in A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM:
THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE

3-78 (1960). For an examination of

"self-development" as the central meaning of free expression, see Baker, Scope of the

First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REv. 964 (1978); see also Baker,
The Process of Change and the Liberty Theory of the FirstAmendment, 55 S.CAL. L.
REv. 293 (1982).
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is not only permissible but it is also necessary if these goals are to be
realized. An international right of correction will provide the opportunity
for truth to emerge, since the excluded segment of society will have had
an opportunity to speak.16 And considering that international propaganda negates a people's right to self-determination and self-governance,
then a right of correction designed to partially correct that cannot be seen
as violative of press rights, but rather as a step toward making the press
sensitive to the values on which its right is premised. 9
Even in the United States, where there is a tendency to reify the right
of the press, scholars increasingly express the opinion that access is essential to any theory of freedom of expression.17 0 This opinion is based
on the fact that the market through which ideas are meant to compete
has failed. 17 ' As Jerome A. Barron argues: "We should reject the premise that press freedom automatically provides free expression for the
entire society."17 2 This observation is even more relevant in terms of the
international media, for in the international arena the market not only
fails, but that failure is overdetermined by political and cultural differences which affect the inclusion and exclusion of views.
At bottom, the international right of correction and the media council
are concerned with the democratization of the international communication process. They promote creative participation by various members of
the international community in the distribution and consumption of social and political communication, especially when the information concerns them. This creative participation is an important dimension of selfdetermination, for self-determination implies, at the minimum, that a
nation or a community has the opportunity to shape events that will
have an impact on its social and political existence.

168. One cannot refer to the emergence of truth when the views of a significant
segment of international society have never been included in the public forum.
169. Providing the institutional means through which falsehoods may be corrected
will surely reduce international misunderstanding and deter conflict.
170. The Supreme Court does not yet share this view with regard to print media,
although it does recognize such a right with respect to the broadcasting media. See Red
Lion Broadcasting v. Federal Communications Commission, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969)
("There is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the Government from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others and to conduct himself as a proxy
or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and voices which are representative of
his community and which would otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the airwaves.").
171. See Barron, supra note 138, at 1641; Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure,
71 IowA L. REV. 1405 (1986).
172. Barron, The Searchfor Media Accountability, 19 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 789, 789
(1985).
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IX.

CONCLUSION

In both its intentional and structural dimensions, international propaganda has seriously undermined the capacity of developing countries to
define their identities and priorities and to conduct their affairs. This
negation of self-determination has two dimensions. First, it denies the
intended victim and its people the right and capacity to conduct their
affairs. Second, it denies the rest of the world the right to accurate information needed to properly evaluate the intended victim. Nothing is more
injurious to a group's right to communicate than to be intentionally misled. If it is true, as Jurgen Habermas argues, that the human species
"maintains itself through the socially coordinated activities of its members and that this coordination has to be established through communication," 173 then undermining that communicative action with intentional
propaganda virtually negates the target group's right to reproduce itself
rationally, which inherently requires undistorted communications.
The structural dimension of propaganda is no less injurious. By selectively informing, it achieves many of the same results as intentional
propaganda, in relation to both the party of discourse and the consuming
audience. Indeed, structural propaganda is often more effective in undermining the right of self-determination than intentional propaganda simply because it is presented as part of the normal flow of information and
is therefore rarely subject to close scrutiny. Simply put, there is a pathology of cognition among the international media. This pathology prevents
the communicator from reflecting upon the cultural, political and economic assumptions that inform his reporting decisions. 17 4
To understand the necessary responses to both types of propaganda,
one must consider the dialectical aspect of the problem: propaganda is at
once an instrument and a result of domination. It is an instrument because propaganda is used to impose objectives and contours on other
human beings. It is a result because the capacity to propagandize and
manipulate emerges out of a structural condition that endows the manipulator with political, economic and cultural capital "superior" to that of
the manipulated.
The antidote to this manipulation must, therefore, consist of long-term
and short-term measures to be taken simultaneously. The long-term ap173. 1 J. HABERMAs, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 397 (1984). See
also P. FREIRE, supra note 52, at 99 ("To impede communication [namely, to distort
and falsify it] is to reduce men to the status of things. . . . [P]eople cannot be truly
human apart from communication, for they are essentially communicative creatures.").
174. For a discussion of the pathology of cognition, see A. GOULDNER, THE DIALECTIC OF IDEOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY

50 (1976).
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proach must confront the structural conditions that make propaganda
acceptable and, indeed, indispensable. In addition, short-term steps must
be taken to lessen the manipulative impact of propaganda and restrain
its dissemination while the structural conditions are remedied.
The long-term structural solution involves a restructuring of international economic and political arrangements that enable one section of the
international community to have a monopoly over cultural capital. Thus
seen, the importance of a new economic order to the emergence of a new
world information and communication order becomes apparent. Specifically, the development of communication infrastructures in developing
countries will enable those communities to disseminate, both internationally and domestically, their version of occurrences and events. This must
be viewed as an urgent priority of the international community, for active participation in international society will lessen the impact of propaganda. In other words, to be an active participant in defining one's environment is to be less vulnerable to external manipulation.
Of the short-term steps considered in this Article, international endeavors (as opposed to national and unilateral actions) should be considered and encouraged. Due to the ineffective nature of national action and
because of the negative implications and consequences of such actions on
international freedom of information, cooperative measures are preferable.
International action consistent with both the concept of freedom of information and the goal of minimizing state control of the communicative
process would provide developing countries with access to the international media. The right to communicate has, as its correlative, the right
to supplement incomplete information and to correct it when it is wrong.
The right of correction and the mass media council should be part of
that access.
If we take the right of self-determination seriously, then we must
neither condone propaganda nor resign ourselves to the unfortunate fact
that it has been a staple diet of international relations. Given the highly
destructive potentional of international propaganda, resignation is a response we cannot afford. We must instead continue to explore the possibility of an institutional arrangement that will be sensitive to both the
tradition of freedom of expression and the fact that propaganda can seriously undermine peoples' right to constitute their communities and run
their affairs. This Article has sought to initiate the process of exploring
such institutions.

